

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
THE AFTERMATH OF RWANDAN GENOCIDE SEXUAL VIOLENCE	8
NOT WORTH THE RISK: WHY POLITICAL WILL FAILED IN THE DAYS OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE	20
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, IS IT REAL?	33
NAZI PROPAGANDA: PERPETRATORS, PASSIVITY, AND PARTISANS	45
THE SEXUAL NATURE OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND THE LIFELONG STRUGGLE	56
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND RAPE IN GENOCIDE	67
WHAT IS GENOCIDE? KHMER ROUGE REGIME, CAMBODIA	79
WOMEN IN GENOCIDE	90
INDEX	99
GLOSSARY	102
BIBLIOGRAPHY	104

Introduction by Lara Hartman

Over time, the definition and understanding of genocide has changed. In his 2016 book, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, Adam Jones discusses sixteen definitions of genocide from 1959 to 2003. Although how these scholars understand genocide is different, there are shared sentiments across definitions. The following three definitions have been taken from Jones' book, and although they come from different scholars and different time periods, there are similarities amongst the three definitions. In 1959, Peter Drost defined genocide as "the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any human collectivity as such."¹ In 1987, John L. Thompson and Gail A. Quets defined genocide as "the extent of destruction of a social collectivity by whatever agents, with whatever intentions, by purposive actions which fall outside the recognized conventions of legitimate warfare."² Finally, in 2003, Barbra Harff expanded her understanding of genocide to also include politicide, defining these two things as "the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group."³

This second volume of the *Maple League Reader* on Genocide & Justice will be focused on genocides that most people are familiar with, and that have had a key role in defining the field of genocide studies. The genocides included in this volume are canonical ones that are still defining the field of genocide research. These genocides are Armenia, the Holocaust, Cambodia, the Balkans, and Rwanda. When it comes to historical significance, these genocides have had a noteworthy impact on the people in each of these countries. The impacts of genocide are affecting people today and will continue to be felt by future generations. A mass cultural extinction is not

something that just ends and goes away; the trauma is everlasting, because those who experienced genocide struggle to go back to the life they knew before the genocide took place.

Throughout the following papers, the authors are aiming to answer a variety of questions: What happened in these countries during the genocides? What are the specific impacts on women and what was their experience like? What was genocide like in different countries? What was the role of the international community and the United Nations in these genocides? Who intervened in the violence, and what role did these interventions play? How long did it take external forces to react to the situation and act? What are the current impacts of genocide on individuals living in these countries? Throughout the following papers, the authors will look at the specifics of the genocides in each of these nations, and it will become clear how the acts of genocide have changed over time. Genocide on its own is not unique, as similar things continue to happen. Each of these genocides may have happened in the past, but individuals are still suffering from the pain and residual trauma.

Throughout the anthology, there is discussion of these genocides and the aftermath which came from each of them. Each of the authors featured in this anthology investigated different genocides and their impacts, which have strengthened the overall field of genocide studies. The following collection of papers demonstrates a range of research in the field of genocide studies, around the Armenian, the Holocaust, Cambodian, the Balkans, and Rwandan genocides.

This anthology contains several papers focused on the Rwandan genocide. Each of the authors takes a different approach to understanding what happened in Rwanda. In “The Aftermath of Rwandan Genocide and Sexual Violence,” the author discusses the current impacts of the Rwandan genocide, and how particularly for women who experienced sexual violence, this suffering has not ceased and will continue to affect the future generations. This author also

discusses the changes that Rwanda faced due to the genocide, and how Rwandan women are still impacted today. In this paper, the author includes stories from different women in Rwanda who experienced this brutalization and did everything they could to survive moving forwards. Although she was still looking at Rwanda, in Mercedes Peters' paper, "Not Worth the Risk: Why Political Will Failed in the Days of the Rwandan Genocide," she explores the Rwandan genocide from an international, political perspective. Peters looks at the response from the United Nations, and how many UN Security Council countries turned their backs and refused to acknowledge that Rwanda needed help. Another approach to this genocide can be seen in the paper from Author 6, titled: "The Sexual Nature of the Rwandan Genocide and the Lifelong Struggle." The author shows how genocide is still affecting people in Rwanda today and will be a lifelong struggle. Author 6 goes on to talk about some of the survivors, and explain that nothing describes the feelings, emotions, pain and suffering a survivor undergoes. This author goes on to talk about how each genocide is unique, but by learning about the methods of tortures, killings, and types of violence, historians can better understand the aftermath of genocide – specifically in Rwanda. Although each of these cases are looking at what took place in Rwanda in 1994, each author takes a different approach, which helps to better illustrate the story of the Rwandan Genocide.

Another genocide that the authors focused on was the Holocaust. In Author 4's paper, "Nazi Propaganda: Perpetrators, Passivity, and Partisans," they discuss the violence that took place during the Holocaust in Nazi Germany, and how throughout the Holocaust, propaganda became a key element used by Adolf Hitler to create a mentality of Anti-Semitism and racial superiority in Germany. Author 4 argues that this propaganda allowed for the growth of a nation majorly composed of passive bystanders and active participants in the atrocities.

Another genocide that is important to explore when looking at the canonical genocides in history is the 1975-1979 Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. In “What is Genocide? Khmer Rouge Regime, Cambodia,” Author 9 demonstrates how this genocide put the less educated, more rural, Cambodians at odds with the educated, more urban, Cambodians. The Cambodian genocide was not strictly based on race like many genocides were, as the primary target of the violence was not race, but was the ‘othering’ of a perceived enemy that many people feared and hated. This ‘othering’ is the reason so many Cambodians died under the Khmer Rouge Regime.

When it comes to looking at the canonical genocides in history, there are certain ideas that transcend borders, which are what the following three papers demonstrate. In “International Justice, is it real?” author 3 looks at the use of the international criminal courts in Nuremburg after World War Two, and the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia. Author 3 also makes an argument as to why the United Nations is unable to truly find justice for the victims of genocide, and that its failure stems directly from its foundation as an international entity. Author 8’s ideas deviate from justice to genocidal rape. In “Sexual Violence and Rape in Genocide,” Author 8 examines rape and sexual misconduct in different genocides to give a comprehensive understanding of this type of violence that takes place during genocide. Rape and sexual violence during genocide further promote the dehumanization of a particular group of people, but this type of violence also separates out the women for their gender. Genocide as a whole is traumatic, but adding rape and sexual violence into the mix creates what Author 8 calls “a fate worse than death, far more horrible than many people can even fathom.”⁴ Similarly to Author 8, Author 10 looks at gendered problems in genocide, but aims to discuss how most of the time, when talking about the sexual violence committed during genocide, women are commonly the victims; but “women can and have been directly involved in genocidal violence against man and women alike.”⁵ Author 10

explores the participation of women in different genocides that have taken place throughout history, with a specific focus on the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. Author 10 demonstrates how women, just as often as men, can be the perpetrators of these violent crimes.

As will be seen throughout this anthology, ‘genocide studies’ is a complex discipline, as no two genocides are exactly alike. The goal of this collection is to provide important information on foundational genocides. This second volume of the *Maple League Reader* on Genocide & Justice demonstrates how canonical genocides have shaped the world. The papers to follow explore the violence that took place during these genocides – especially violence of a sexual nature – that not only changed the lives of individuals, but also the functioning of said countries. Although genocide may be something that took place in a country’s past, the impacts run deep and continue to affect people today.

Notes and References

¹ Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (Oxfordshire, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 15.

² Jones, *Genocide*, 17.

³ Jones, 18.

⁴ “Sexual Violence and Rape in Genocide,” 90.

⁵ “Women and Genocide,” 103.

The Aftermath of Rwandan Genocide Sexual Violence

Nadia Champion

The small African state of Rwanda fell into genocide in April 1994, a state which lasted one hundred days and caused the death of approximately eight hundred thousand people.¹ The genocide largely involved Hutus murdering Tutsis and moderate Hutus with machetes, clubs, and whatever was readily available.² Tutsis did whatever they could to survive; some hid in the marshes, some ran through the forests. Eugenie Kayierere, one of the twenty out of six thousand who survived the Kayumba Hill, said: “We felt already among the dead. We were no longer completely human anymore.”³ Many of the people who survived the genocide found it nearly impossible to go back to their pre-genocide lives, particularly the many women who experienced brutal sexual violence. This essay argues that for women, particularly those who experienced sexual violence, suffering due to the Rwandan genocide has not ceased and will continue to affect future generations. Female victims of sexual violence do not only face coming to terms with the death of loved ones, but they also face ongoing concerns. For women, especially those who experienced sexual violence, suffering in Rwanda continues due to many women becoming head-of-the-household in Rwanda’s patriarchal society, experiences prosecuting rape, damaged mental health, the fear and/or reality of not marrying, mutilation, HIV/AIDS, babies of genocide, and the loss of a community of women.

Rape was wide-spread and extremely violent during the genocide. Jean-Baptiste Munyankore, who survived by hiding in forests and marshes, said: “we did not mock the women who had been raped, because all the women expected to be raped.”⁴ It is thought that two hundred fifty thousand women were raped, often in front of their loved ones.⁵ The rapes were extremely brutal: “women were individually raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels, held in sexual slavery (either collectively or through

forced ‘marriage’) or sexually mutilated.”⁶ Rape left women both physically and emotionally scarred.

As a result of the genocide, many women were left as the head of their household, causing hardships in Rwanda’s patriarchal society. Most Tutsi women in this position were widows, and most Hutu women’s husbands were in jail. Human Rights Watch’s 1996 book, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, reported that after the genocide “70 percent of the population is female and... 50 percent of all households are headed by women.”⁷ Many Tutsi women took in orphans as well as caring for their surviving children. Francine Niyitegeka almost died after being clubbed on the head, was nursed back to health by her husband, had two babies after the genocide, and took in four orphans.⁸ Although Francine seems to have willingly taken in orphans, they presumably would have created a larger economic and social burden on the family. The orphans may have reminded Francine and her husband of the children they had lost in the war.

In the five years following the genocide, inheritance laws made it impossible for women to inherit their husband’s or father’s inheritance unless they specified this.⁹ Many women and children were not able to claim the land they had been living on, and were prevented from making money from it, due to the fact that they were women. Households are more prone to poverty if they have a “lack of access to land, lack of livestock, and lack of labor.”¹⁰ Because female-headed households did not often retain land post-genocide and were less-likely to get work, they struggled with poverty more than male-led households.¹¹

Trials which involved rape, both at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and later at the *Gacaca* courts, presented new challenges for Rwandan women. Rape trials at the ICTR relied heavily on testimonies given by victims of sexual violence.¹² The court process of

giving a statement, going over that statement, having it presented, and being cross-examined was presumably a difficult task for these women. In Rwanda it is not considered proper to talk about rape, let alone to say the word for penis or vagina.¹³ Lawyers had to get women to give actual descriptions of their rapes, rather than the women proclaiming that “we got married,” as they often did to avoid using more harsh words.¹⁴ Rwandan women’s uncomfortableness in describing their experiences is evident. It can be assumed that, for at least some of the women who testified, it was an extremely negative experience which brought up bad memories. After she testified, one woman said: “Today I would not accept to testify to be traumatized for a second time. In any case, I’m already dead”.¹⁵

The *Gacaca* courts, Rwanda’s community-based court system, started trying those convicted of rape in 2008, which posed new issues.¹⁶ Some women could not prosecute their rapists because they were not aware of their identities; some women chose not to testify because they thought it would create issues in their community or their family.¹⁷ *Gacaca* courts were not able to successfully provide women with anonymity. Even when they attempted to take testimony behind closed doors, it was often known in the communities who was testifying.¹⁸ Many women were frightened that the local judges would tell others about the testimony. They were concerned the judges would not be impartial because they were a part of the community. A few women were concerned that rape would not be taken as seriously in a *Gacaca* court.¹⁹ A number of victims who testified were intimidated, threatened, had stones thrown at them, and even had to relocate to protect themselves from backlash against their testimony.²⁰ If a Rwandan woman wanted to go through with her case, she had to relive extremely painful experiences, likely lose her anonymity, and possibly be threatened. Many

women likely did not testify because of how painful the memories of sexual violation were.

Many women who suffered through sexual violence and the loss of loved ones saw a deterioration of their mental health. Due to the brutal nature of the sexual violence endured by Rwandan women, their mental health could be negatively affected in many ways. Directly following the genocide, approximately eighty percent of the country's doctors were dead or had left the country.²¹ This left a huge gap in the treatment of mental health, particularly sexual health. Although aid organizations came to Rwanda, few were focused on the well-being of sexual violence victims.²² Many women's groups were created by Rwandans in order to support other women who had gone through sexual violence.²³ Women who need access to a hospital for mental health reasons may have trouble getting there if it is a long way away and they live in abject poverty, as many Rwandan women do. One woman commented about going to the hospital for mental health concerns: "I join my neighbors, tell them about these problems, and ask them to help me...if possible, they take me to the hospital."²⁴ Even when women were able to get to the doctor, the doctors were not always trained to deal with the women's conditions; one woman went to a general practitioner for traumatic depression and he gave her sleeping pills, "so that I would not experience strange fear anymore."²⁵ Many Rwandan survivors of genocide and sexual violence have mental health concerns, but even if they manage to get to a hospital, there may not be a doctor there who is trained to help these women.

Many women who had been raped feared that public knowledge of the event would make it impossible to find a husband. This was a huge concern in the years following the genocide; in 1996, it was estimated that "70 percent of the population is female."²⁶ The disparity between the number of women and men would have made it even more difficult for Rwandan women to find

husbands. After one woman's testimony about her rape at the ICTR, the entire community became aware and her fiancé broke up with her.²⁷ Odette Mukamuseni was a teenaged girl who was saved from certain death by a looter named Callixte, who decided she would be his wife.²⁸ After the genocide, Jeanette escaped Callixte, came back to Rwanda, and lived an isolated life.²⁹ When Jean Hatzfeld attempted to interview Jeanette for his book, *Life laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak*, she originally told him a fake story which did not include sexual abuse from a Hutu killer.³⁰ As Hatzfeld explains, Jeanette likely did not want the story to be told because of the rumors it would create in her community.³¹ It is safe to assume that Jeanette did not want this information to be known because she was concerned about her prospects of getting a husband. Many women wanted husbands but could not find one, due to their experiences with sexual violence.

Rwandan women did not just suffer mentally, socially, and psychologically, but sexual violence also left many of their physical bodies in dangerous condition. Women experienced extremely brutal rapes, which often left them mutilated and infected with HIV/AIDS. Young girls were not spared from rape. Girls as young as two years old were raped during the genocide.³² The mutilation women endured is hard to fathom; women were repeatedly gang-raped, raped with objects, had their body parts cut off, and endured many other torturous acts.³³ Women had their breasts cut off, their vaginas cut, had boiling water or acid thrown on their vaginas, had unborn children cut out of them, were penetrated with foreign objects, and had gasoline poured on them and were lit on fire.³⁴ One woman, Denise, had parts of her vaginal canal cut off and put on a stick outside of her house.³⁵ In several cases, sticks were forcefully shoved into the body, and in most mutilation cases, women experienced extreme bleeding and

life-long pain.³⁶ These injuries not only lessened their chance of marrying, but also presumably took away the human experience of having physical pleasure through sex.

Through genocide rape, many women contracted HIV/AIDS. Many survivors wonder whether they have AIDS, but they do not get tested because they do not have money or access to a clinic.³⁷ Mutilation and HIV/AIDS not only destroyed women's bodies but also their prospects with men. Furaha, a woman who was raped during the genocide and contracted HIV/AIDS, had her husband leave her because he did not want to wear condoms during sex, and Furaha was now unable to bear children.³⁸ Another woman, Olga, often thought suicide was a better option than living with HIV/AIDS.³⁹ Many women would be leaving behind small children if they died from HIV/AIDS.⁴⁰ This was particularly troubling as many mothers were the sole survivors of their family, or their child was conceived through rape and their family had no interest in caring for it.⁴¹ Many groups of friends, after losing loved ones in the genocide, watched their friends slowly die from HIV/AIDS. Fifi Mukangoga was raped during the genocide and contracted HIV/AIDS; a fellow rape-victim, Chantal, became a close friend and watched Fifi's illness progress.⁴² When Fifi succumbed to her illness, Chantal commented: "And now Fifi is the last one in our group who is dying."⁴³ It is safe to assume that Chantal felt incredible pain, and possibly guilt, after being raped alongside Fifi, surviving the genocide, and watching Fifi die while she still lived. One survivor's obviously AIDS-riddled rapist intended to infect her with AIDS, saying: "Take a good look... I want you to die slowly like me."⁴⁴ It is evident that some rapists wanted there to be a long line of Tutsi women who were dying even after the genocide was over. Through HIV/AIDS, the number of people killed in the genocide continued to grow and cause the living incredible pain.

After enduring sexual violence during the genocide, many women became pregnant by the men who raped them and killed their families. Women struggled immensely with the idea of carrying a child conceived by rapists and murderers. It is estimated that anywhere between two thousand and five thousand children were born of rape, although survivors in some areas believe the more accurate number to be around ten thousand.⁴⁵ These children are known by a number of names: ‘unwanted children,’ ‘children of bad memories,’ ‘devil’s children,’ ‘little killers,’ and ‘children of hate.’⁴⁶ In many families, the presence of a genocide baby drives the family apart, as some want the baby to be kept, and some want it gone.⁴⁷ Presumably, the child would cause immense suffering on the family as a constant reminder of everything the genocide took from them. While some women sincerely do love children of rape, some feel that they cannot ever love them.⁴⁸ One woman said this when her twins of rape cried: “my mother would tell me to stop the noise or to give these children back to their father.”⁴⁹

Some women refused to keep babies of rape. After the child was born, they would leave it at the hospital, declare it a ward of the state, commit infanticide, and some women let them die after taking their babies home.⁵⁰ Although abortion is illegal in Rwanda, many women had “self-induced” abortions, which often resulted in physical injury.⁵¹ Whether or not women chose to have the baby, leave it at the hospital, or keep it, they were still profoundly affected by carrying the child of their rapist.

The genocide was not only perpetrated by predominantly Hutu men; women also took part. In Jean Hatzfeld’s *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak*, he interviews a group of men in prison who were active members in the killing. The men say that the women rarely did actual killing, but instead looted houses, fed their husbands, and called the men when they found a Tutsi, or shoved her into the river.⁵² One of the interviewees said: “There were fierce wives

who wanted to... help with the killing,” but the men in charge scolded them for trying to do a man’s job.⁵³ Many women likely did take part through the looting, but some did kill. The most famous example would be Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, who was the Minister of Family Affairs and Women’s Development: she was convicted of many charges, including “public incitement to commit genocide... extermination... other inhumane acts,” and rape.⁵⁴ Nyiramasuhuko encouraged men to rape the women she made strip, as did her son, and it is thought her daughter-in-law also is connected to genocide and rape crimes.⁵⁵ Nuns within the Catholic church have also been found guilty of violence during the genocide; they were convicted of not feeding refugees, and providing the *Interahamwe* with gas in order to burn the building housing the Tutsis, and requesting that the Tutsis be taken away from their monastery.⁵⁶ Even though there was some violence before the genocide, women likely still had some solidarity with each other, regardless of being a Hutu or Tutsi. The fact that women perpetrated genocide presumably made it more difficult for women to feel comfortable talking with each other after the genocide. If women had not taken part, it would have given Tutsis, particularly those who had been raped, an ally, someone to whom both the survivors and perpetrators could talk. A survivor, innocent Rwililiza, said this on the topic of silence: “The survivors... Being powerless to voice one’s anger, sadness, and longing for what is lost, and unable to tell one’s whole story for fear of offending a Hutu or annoying the authorities-this inability to reveal one’s heart is sheer torture.”⁵⁷ The genocide, especially female perpetrators, destroyed any solidarity between Hutu and Tutsi women which could have aided the women’s recovery from loss and sexual violence.

The number and speed of Rwandans killed (eight hundred thousand in one hundred days) shocked the world, but beyond this number lies more suffering. Thousands of women and girls

were raped and then brutally murdered. As Romeo Dallaire, leader of the UN mission in Rwanda, explains: “They died in a position of total vulnerability, flat on their backs, with their legs bent and knees wide apart.”⁵⁸ The horror of these deaths is made worse when it is considered that hundreds of thousands of women experienced similarly brutal sexual violence and are still living. For many sexually violated women, the pain they experienced due to the genocide is not likely to stop. Women who were raped face anonymity issues if they pursue a court case, living in a patriarchal society as both mother and father to many children, ongoing mental health issues, the fear and/or the reality of not getting married, living with HIV/AIDS, raising children of rape, and living with women who perpetrated crimes. Maria, like countless other women, was brutally raped and mutilated, contracted the AIDS disease, and cannot ever have sex.⁵⁹ Maria does not like to see men, and struggles with mental health; she feels her future has been crushed.⁶⁰ Maria stated, her head down: “What has happened has happened... Now the question is how to survive.”⁶¹

Notes and References

- ¹ Patricia A. Weitsman, "The Politics of Identity and Sexual Violence: A Review of Bosnia and Rwanda," *Human Rights Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2008): 572, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20072859>.
- ² Weitsman, "Politics of Identity, 572.
- ³ Jean Hatzfeld, *The Antelope's Strategy: Living in Rwanda after the Genocide* (New York, NY: Picador Press, 2009), 37, 45.
- ⁴ Jean Hatzfeld, *Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak* (New York, NY: Other Press, 2006), 71.
- ⁵ Donatilla Mukamana and Petra Brysiewicz, "The Lived Experience of Genocide Rape Survivors in Rwanda," *Journal of Nursing Scholarship* 40, no. 4 (2008): 380.
- ⁶ Binaifer Nowrojee, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 2.
- ⁷ Nowrojee, *Shattered Lives*, 3.
- ⁸ Hatzfeld, *Life Laid Bare*, 38-40.
- ⁹ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath: Women in Postgenocide Rwanda*, by Catharine Newbury and Hannah Baldwin, Working Paper no. 303 (Washington, DC: PDF, 2000), 7, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacj323.pdf.
- ¹⁰ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 7.
- ¹¹ United States Agency for International Development, 7.
- ¹² Jonneke Koomen, "'Without These Women, the Tribunal Cannot Do Anything': The Politics of Witness Testimony on Sexual Violence at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda," *Signs* 38, no. 2 (2013): 257, <https://doi.org/10.1086/667200>.
- ¹³ Koomen, "Without These Women," 265.
- ¹⁴ Koomen, 265.
- ¹⁵ Koomen, 267.
- ¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda's Community-Based Gacaca Courts* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2011), 112, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandas-community-based-gacaca-courts>.
- ¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Justice Compromised*, 115-6.
- ¹⁸ Human Rights Watch, 112.
- ¹⁹ Human Rights Watch, 113-5.
- ²⁰ Human Rights Watch, 118.
- ²¹ Maggie Zaly, Julia Rubin Smith, and Theresa Betancourt, "Primary Mental Health Care for Survivors of Collective Sexual Violence in Rwanda," *Global Public Health* 6, no. 3 (2010): 259, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2010.493165>.
- ²² Zaly, Rubin-Smith, and Betancourt, "Primary Mental Health," 259.
- ²³ Zaly, Rubin-Smith, and Betancourt, 260-1.
- ²⁴ Zaly, Rubin-Smith, and Betancourt, 263.
- ²⁵ Zaly, Rubin-Smith, and Betancourt, 264.
- ²⁶ Nowrojee, *Shattered Lives*, 3.
- ²⁷ Koomen, "Without These Women," 267.
- ²⁸ Hatzfeld, *Life Laid Bare*, 153-4.
- ²⁹ Hatzfeld, 149-50.
- ³⁰ Hatzfeld, 150.
- ³¹ Hatzfeld, 151.
- ³² Nowrojee, *Shattered Lives*, 45.
- ³³ Nowrojee, 25-41.
- ³⁴ Nowrojee, 37-8.
- ³⁵ Nowrojee, 38.
- ³⁶ Nowrojee, 38.
- ³⁷ Nowrojee, 40.
- ³⁸ Mukamana and Brysiewicz, "Lived Experience," 382.
- ³⁹ Mukamana and Brysiewicz, 382.
- ⁴⁰ Mukamana and Brysiewicz, 382.

- ⁴¹ Mukamana and Brysiewicz, 382.
- ⁴² Rwanda Video Gallery, "Eyewitness Testimony: Mary "Fifi" Mukangoga," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 28 August 2013, <http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/rwanda/rwanda-video-gallery/eyewitness-testimony-mary-fifi-mukangoga>.
- ⁴³ Rwanda Video Gallery, "Eyewitness Testimony."
- ⁴⁴ Marie-Consolee Mukangendo, "Caring for Children Born of Rape in Rwanda," in *Born of War: Protecting Children of Sexual Violence Survivors in Conflict Zones*, ed. by R. Charli Carpenter (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007), 45.
- ⁴⁵ Mukangendo, "Caring for Children," 40.
- ⁴⁶ Nowrojee, *Shattered Lives*, 46; Mukangendo, "Caring for Children," 40.
- ⁴⁷ Mukangendo, "Caring for Children," 48.
- ⁴⁸ Mukangendo, 48.
- ⁴⁹ Nowrojee, *Shattered Lives*, 48.
- ⁵⁰ Nowrojee, 47.
- ⁵¹ Nowrojee, 4, 46.
- ⁵² Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak* (New York, NY: Picador Press, 2005), 108-13.
- ⁵³ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, 109-10.
- ⁵⁴ Nicole Hogg, "Women's Participation in the Rwandan Genocide: Mothers or Monsters?," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 877 (2010): 92, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383110000019>.
- ⁵⁵ Hogg, "Women's Participation," 92; United States Attorney's Office District of Massachusetts, "Woman Charged with Unlawfully Obtaining Citizenship by Misrepresenting her Activities During the 1994 Rwandan Genocide," USAO, 24 June 2010, <https://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2010/June/MunyenyeziBeatricePR.html>.
- ⁵⁶ Hogg, "Women's Participation," 97-9.
- ⁵⁷ Hatzfeld, *The Antelope's Strategy*, 90.
- ⁵⁸ Roméo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto, ON: Vintage Canada, 2003).
- ⁵⁹ Nowrojee, *Shattered Lives*, 40-1.
- ⁶⁰ Nowrojee, 40-1.
- ⁶¹ Nowrojee, 40-1.

Not Worth the Risk: Why Political Will Failed in the Days of the Rwandan Genocide

Mercedes Peters 100123942

Dr. James Sedgwick

HIST 3693: Genocide and Justice

28 November 2014

The Rwandan genocide occurred from April to July in 1994, when the country's majority Hutu population set out to destroy its moderate members and the Tutsi minority.¹ As news of the genocide broke, the international community—namely the United States, who had the most influence in matters of state intervention—turned its back; many policymakers refused to say that genocide was happening. The UN peacekeeping mission there first pulled out a crucial number of soldiers after the genocide had started and then, when they could deny it no longer, arrived with reinforcements too late. Rwanda has since been remembered as a catastrophic failure on the part of the United Nations, and scholarly reasoning behind this failure falls on a lack of political will to help the country. But why that will faltered is important to understand. This essay argues that the absence of political will to intervene in Rwanda stemmed from two factors: the first, influential world powers like the United States had grown weary of peacekeeping missions after many poorly conducted efforts in the early 1990s. At the same time, the genocide happening in Rwanda did not jeopardize any major powers' national interests, and therefore, no one wanted to intervene. Thus, Rwanda was left on its own, and the failure of countries to perform their duty under the Genocide Convention of 1948 has been criticized ever since.

Peacekeeping actions in Rwanda must be explored in the context of a larger historical thread of United Nations intervention. UN Peacekeeping missions got their start in 1948 when the brand-new UN Security Council sent a force of blue berets to the Middle East to monitor ceasefires.² From then until 1991, thirteen UN missions were authorized,³ using Peacekeepers to primarily manage the transition from war to peace. Missions then were used to mediate 'inter-state conflict,' meaning that they only dealt with issues between two states; they would never break up civil war.⁴ This is because at the time, there was a focus by major powers on state

sovereignty. In order to ensure that that sovereignty remained, the UN required consent from the states it was working with, and required its soldiers to remain neutral and refrain from using force unless their lives were in danger.⁵ They were not allowed to intervene in any other way.⁶

In a post-WWII world, the idea of peace for all with non-aggressive mediation was admirable, but it was not used often, especially with the outbreak of the cold war. As tensions grew between the United States and the Soviet Union, with both countries possessing veto power on the UN Security Council, there was a damper put on many of the organization's proposed Peacekeeping missions. What the US brought to the table, the USSR could wave, and vice-versa. When the cold war ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and tensions in the UN dissolved, a new interest in peacekeeping developed. With the United States now elevated as the top world power, President George H.W. Bush "declared a 'new world order,'" and set the tone for the next step in UN Peacekeeping history.⁷

With a new outlook on humanitarian intervention, and what seemed finally like a chance to achieve true peace, the UN—influenced greatly by the United States—approved twenty-seven missions between 1988 and 1995.⁸ However, with a change in the amount of peacekeeping ventures came a shift in how the operations were carried out. Whereas before the shift, the UN really only went into areas of conflict as the fighting itself ended, with a "renewed optimism"⁹ in peacekeeping ability, the UN sent many missions into places where fighting had not stopped.¹⁰ In the words of Michael Barnett, "the UN could only be effective when there was a 'peace to keep.'"¹¹ While sending troops into hot war zones may have been all right if the UN had altered its mandates to fit each situation, the policies it held remained the same, which caused unforeseen issues. For one, sending soldiers into places still in conflict, with a contract disallowing them to make any offensive move, left them powerless in many situations. At the

same time, according to Saadia Touval, “part of the U.N. problem [was] that it [had] no readily accessible military or economic resources of its own.”¹² It relied on support from member states that held on to old ways with confidence; even if people on the ground called for more assistance, there was a high chance they would get none.

It was the old framework thrust into a new world that created a huge drop in confidence in the UN. In the United States especially, as they had headed the charge into increased humanitarianism, the downfalls of peacekeeping became painfully evident. While President Bill Clinton came into a fresh term of office with the same confidence in intervention that his predecessor had, he soon discovered that he was dealing with a Congress already tired of the whole deal.¹³ As Clinton settled into his new seat, back-to-back intervention failures in both Somalia—where eighteen American peacekeepers were killed¹⁴—and in the former Yugoslavia—where a constrained mandate did more to hinder the mission than help it¹⁵—not only further hardened Congress, but Clinton himself, toward peacekeeping efforts. Somalia especially, according to Victoria Holt, caused a “fear of US military casualties.”¹⁶ No one wanted to send their own soldiers to die for another country. At the same time, Congress was putting pressure on Clinton to cut the country’s peacekeeping budget.¹⁷ The peacekeeping trendsetter began to balk.

In the face of failure, the United States put their reputation and the protection of their own people before international humanitarian effort, and thus, falling into line with their biggest supporter, the UN and its prominent members followed suit. Suddenly, the organization that relied on state government support in the first place lost its fervor for peacekeeping missions, and a new, tighter criterion for choosing when and how to aid countries in turmoil was developed.¹⁸ This checklist, of course, was created to suit the interests of voting UN players.

Now, there had to be genuine political interest in a situation for the Security Council to even consider sending a force in—and just because there was interest, did not mean that proposals for missions would go through. Countries with veto power, like the United States, could shoot something down if it did not suit them. And with the US as the head power, the ultimate decision of whether to engage in a mission often fell into their hands.

In March 1994, one month before the beginning of the Rwandan genocide, Clinton pulled all US peacekeepers from the Somalia mission.¹⁹ By that time, it was evident that the international community was losing faith in the UN's ability to conduct successful interventions. Active missions would not be pulled from the field, of course, but it was not likely that they would extend beyond their mandate if a change arose. One of these types of missions, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), deployed in October of 1993, was hard at work “overseeing the implementation of the Arusha Accords,” a cease-fire agreement that would hopefully end a four-year civil war between the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front and the primarily Hutu Rwandan government.²⁰ Achieving peace was not easy, and the US was not pleased with the amount of time that it was taking to achieve UNAMIR's goals; they were ready to pull out if a cooperative, transitional government was not established in a timely manner.²¹

UNAMIR, headed by Canadian soldier Roméo Dallaire, was a small unit, two thousand five hundred peacekeepers strong, with weak weapons and a mandate not prepared to deal with genocide.²² It did not have much support from the outside.²³ The deeply rooted tensions between Hutu and Tutsi people in Rwanda were well-known by everyone involved in the mission; pockets of isolated Hutu attacks on groups of Tutsi people that had erupted in the years leading up to 1994 were brushed off as regular occurrences by UN administration.²⁴ Which is why, when Dallaire began voicing concerns about Hutu actions in Rwanda, he was ignored. According to

Samantha Power, the January before the genocide began, Dallaire received information from a Hutu informant “high up in the inner circles of the Rwandan government” describing “the rapid arming and training of local militias.” He discovered that there was a plan to “register all Tutsi in Kigali.” The informant also revealed a plan that would turn into the brutal murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers that would shock the world. The government wanted “to ‘guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda.’”²⁵ Dallaire, sensing that something big was coming, planned to begin a series of arms raids. However, New York rejected them; they were too far outside of his mandate, and if American people in Somalia were killed within the boundaries of theirs, it was not worth the risk.²⁶ Yet, evidence of a planned massacre piled up. Militia units began marching around carrying machetes, target lists from ‘death squads’ were being released; Dallaire continued to notify his superiors, but his mandate prevented him from any real action, and the UN was not going to give him any extra support.²⁷

And yet, Dallaire’s fears were imagined on April 6th, 1994. Mere hours after the plane holding Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down, a wave of chillingly organized violence by Hutus, against Tutsis and Hutu moderates, erupted across the country. Immediately, roadblocks were set up, the intimate slaughter of thousands left bodies piled in the streets, and pre-written target lists were announced over the radio.²⁸ It began like clockwork, and it became clear right then that the UN was powerless to stop it. The plans to undermine UNAMIR control were realized. While protecting Habyarimana’s successor, ten Belgian peacekeepers were coerced into surrendering their weapons to a group of Hutu people. They were then cut down and mutilated with machetes.²⁹ Following the massacre, Belgium withdrew its troops, who made up a sizeable contingent of the peacekeeping force on the ground, just like the genocidaires had planned. But UNAMIR would be weakened further still as Belgium began pressuring the UN to

pull out of Rwanda.³⁰ While the west debated whether to continue with UNAMIR, in Rwanda, the number of systematic murders grew exponentially.

The weakness perceived on the ground did not come at the fault of the soldiers, but from the hands of policymakers a world away. While Dallaire demanded more, the United States was prepared to withdraw all of its forces from Rwanda. With Belgium pleading with the UN to pull UNAMIR altogether, and an already weakening patience with peacekeeping missions in the international community, the superpower threw its support behind ending the mission. Members of the Security Council were reported to have been “[distant] and [aloof] from the”³¹ situation in the first place, and with UNAMIR already echoing Somalia, there was not a single country willing to contribute troops to a longer Rwanda mission.³² On April 21st, the United Nations voted to “reduce UNAMIR’s presence and mandate, [leaving in place] only those troops that were required to assist General Dallaire’s efforts to gain a cease fire.”³³

What was happening in Rwanda could not be ignored. With a bare-bones force of peacekeepers left, people were dying at unthinkable speeds, and Rwandans were losing hope in the UN, fast. However, officials in the United States and United Nations refused to call the evident genocide for what it was. Power argues that the US knew full well what Rwanda was dealing with;³⁴ western media, especially in the States, had been reporting on Hutu violence against Tutsi people throughout the genocide,³⁵ and with the information coming in from Dallaire and others, it was just not practical to say that governments were not aware. The New York Times reported on April 8th that “Kigali [had] dissolved into terror and chaos”;³⁶ even American people had to know what was happening. Despite the evidence, as far as the American government was concerned, there was no genocide in Rwanda.

They did know what was going on, though. For one, the “Clinton administration opposed use of the term.”³⁷ In fact, the government seemed to be doing everything in its power to avoid the word. US officials undermined the number of deaths reported by humanitarians by saying that they “[believed] that 500,000 [the number of Tutsi and moderate Hutu deaths counted by May 18th] may be an exaggerated estimate, but no accurate figures [were] available.”³⁸ By keeping uncertainty high, they could ensure that they had some level of justification to not intervene. Unless they were publicly sure of genocide, they could not very well go in. To keep it out of their vocabulary, the government called what was happening in Rwanda “acts of genocide” instead.³⁹ The reasons given as to why this term differed from real genocide were vague. American spokeswoman Christine Shelly said that ‘acts of genocide’ was “a legal definition,” but had a hard time actually defining what it was.⁴⁰

The government paired the same uncertainty tactics with a fairly good working knowledge of the 1948 Genocide Convention to further justify staying out of Rwanda. Shelly said that, though some of the killings fit into categories the Convention called genocide, contrary to the evidence being released, the United States could also not be sure where the intent of the killers lay. She went on to say that “the law did not contain an ‘absolute requirement... to intervene directly,’” which, in hindsight, gave away the fact that they were trying to keep from admitting genocide in the first place.⁴¹ In truth, the Convention does indeed require “the Contracting Parties... to prevent and punish [genocide]...[and] to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide.”⁴² The United States ratified in 1948,⁴³ meaning that if they did say genocide, they were required to at least make an effort to stop it.

In the months and years after the Rwandan genocide ended, many people questioned the adamant denial of the United States and UN members for the first two months of the

slaughter. Part of the answer, of course, came from the loss of faith in UN peacekeeping missions. If a government threw another group of soldiers into a conflict that held the potential of failure, they would receive more criticism. Reputation was important, especially during a period where the UN was struggling on an international level. According to Barnett, “the UN [especially the US representatives] had more to lose by taking action and being associated with another failure than it did by not taking action and allowing the genocide in Rwanda.”⁴⁴ The other part came out of what Rwanda had to offer to the world—which, according to the actions taken by the international community, was very little. A will to intervene, it seems, stems from what Power calls “vital national interests” in an area.⁴⁵ Rwanda had nothing that Western leaders needed, and since the mass-murder happening there did not affect them directly, they felt no need to even consider helping. This was made clear in the preparations for reinstating the UNAMIR mission a few weeks after its initial close.

By the end of April, it became evident to many—including some of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council—that removing UN forces from Rwanda had been a bad idea.⁴⁶ The major powers now found new pressure from their colleagues to do something beyond a regular peacekeeping mission. It was clear that the UN had to do something that involved peace enforcement, which called for more people, more resources, and more power for the soldiers.⁴⁷ After much deliberation, UNAMIR II was born; it would arrive in Rwanda on June 23rd.⁴⁸ But still, in the implementation of the mission, the United States and other Western powers dragged their feet. Michael Lipson says that “UN member states declined to provide troops to implement the [new] resolution.”⁴⁹ The United States agreed to provide “armored support” if African countries sent troops,⁵⁰ but would not send any of their own. US officials began to argue about the specifics of providing funds and giving equipment to the mission. By

the time they did provide the armed personnel carriers they promised – which arrived a month after UNAMIR II deployed – they were “missing the radios and heavy machine guns that would be needed if UN troops came under fire.”⁵¹

In the end, Power states that it was the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front that eventually stopped the genocide.⁵² UNAMIR II had come too late to really make much of a difference. Its safe zone still faltered, and it also failed to deal with the mass media propaganda campaign that drove the genocide forward.⁵³ Eight hundred thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been lost in one hundred days.⁵⁴ As the news broke, fingers began to point at the UN. It had not done enough, it had not provided enough, and the major powers that held sway in their decisions had not done anything to prevent it or stop it, like they had promised to do. In 1999, the UN published an inquiry about the actions taken in Rwanda from April to July, 1994. They concluded what many already had:

The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations Presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness. This lack of political will affected the response by the Secretariat and decision-making by the Security Council, but was also evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the necessary troops for the United Nations Assistance Missions for Rwanda (UNAMIR).⁵⁵

In the aftermath of a genocide like that, where people died by the thousands at the hands of their neighbours and the world kept silent, questions are ultimately raised about why no one did enough, why there was no will to fulfill duty. Rwanda just seemed to happen in the wrong place, at the wrong time. That does not make it any less horrible, and that does not release states from guilt for not providing aid. But in the aftermath of a series of failed peacekeeping missions, where confidence in UN intervention dwindled, and in a corner of the world that seemed to be of

no interest to countries with influence, the fact that Rwanda was left on its own comes as no surprise. The sting of the Holocaust in 1948 had dulled by 1994, and the very Convention that bound countries to prevent 'race murder' was used to avoid dealing with it. There is no changing what has happened. Rwanda is still working towards healing, but the world can use this failure as a lesson. We have a duty to prevent genocide; may we work harder to wipe it out in the future.

Notes and References

- ¹ United Nations, "Backgrounder," accessed 4 November 2014, <http://www.un.org/events/rwanda/backgrounder.html>.
- ² United Nations, "History of Peacekeeping," accessed 4 November 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml>.
- ³ Michelle Lipson, "A 'Garbage Can Model' of UN Peacekeeping," *Global Governance* 13, no. 1 (2007): 79, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800643>.
- ⁴ United Nations, "What is Peacekeeping?," accessed 8 October 2014, <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>.
- ⁵ United Nations, "What is Peacekeeping?,"
- ⁶ Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," in *The Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, eds. Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (New York, NY: Basic Book, 2002), 229.
- ⁷ Victoria K. Holt and Michael G. MacKinnon, "The Origins and Evolution of US Policy Towards Peace Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 1 (2008): 19-20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310701879860>.
- ⁸ Lipson, "A 'Garbage Can Model'," 79.
- ⁹ Holt and MacKinnon, "US Policy Towards Peace Operations," 19.
- ¹⁰ United Nations, "Post Cold-War Surge," accessed 8 October 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml>.
- ¹¹ Michael N. Barnett, "The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda," *Cultural Anthropology* 12, no. 4 (2008): 569, <https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1997.12.4.551>.
- ¹² Saadia Touval, "Why the UN Fails," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 5 (1994): 52, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20046830>.
- ¹³ Holt and MacKinnon, "US Policy Towards Peace Operations," 19.
- ¹⁴ Holt and MacKinnon, 21.
- ¹⁵ Michael Lipson, "Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 5 (2007): 19, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107074283>.
- ¹⁶ Holt and MacKinnon, "US Policy Towards Peace Operations," 21.
- ¹⁷ Holt and MacKinnon, 21.
- ¹⁸ Barnett, "The UN Security Council," 568.
- ¹⁹ Holt and MacKinnon, "US Policy Towards Peace Operations," 21.
- ²⁰ Barnett, "The UN Security Council," 551.
- ²¹ Barnett, 551.
- ²² Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998), 5, <https://www.carnegie.org/publications/preventing-genocide-how-the-early-use-of-force-might-have-succeeded-in-rwanda/>.
- ²³ Barnett, "The UN Security Council," 558.
- ²⁴ Bill Berkeley, "Road to a Genocide," in *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, eds. Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), 108.
- ²⁵ Samantha Power, "'Rwanda: 'Mostly in a Listening Mode'," in *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2013), 343.
- ²⁶ Power, "'Mostly in a Listening Mode'," 344.
- ²⁷ Power, 345.
- ²⁸ Power, 333.
- ²⁹ Power, 332.
- ³⁰ Feil, *Preventing Genocide*, 2.
- ³¹ Barnett, "The UN Security Council," 558.
- ³² Barnett, 559.
- ³³ Barnett, 574.
- ³⁴ Power, "'Mostly in a Listening Mode'," 345.
- ³⁵ Power, 356.
- ³⁶ William E. Schmidt, "Troops Rampage in Rwanda: Dead Said to Include Premier," *New York Times*, 8 April 1994, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/08/world/troops-rampage-in-rwanda-dead-said-to-include-premier.html>.

- ³⁷ Power, “‘Mostly in a Listening Mode’,” 359.
- ³⁸ Power, 362.
- ³⁹ Power, 363.
- ⁴⁰ Power, 363.
- ⁴¹ Power, 360.
- ⁴² United Nations General Assembly, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, A/RES/260/(III) (Paris, FR: United Nations General Assembly, 1948), 280, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.html>.
- ⁴³ United Nations General Assembly, *Crime of Genocide*, 310.
- ⁴⁴ Barnett, “The UN Security Council,” 561.
- ⁴⁵ Samantha Power, “Raising the Cost of Genocide,” in *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, eds. Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), 251.
- ⁴⁶ Power, “‘Mostly in a Listening Mode’,” 377.
- ⁴⁷ Power, 377-8.
- ⁴⁸ Power, 380.
- ⁴⁹ Lipson, “Organized Hypocrisy?,” 14.
- ⁵⁰ Power, “‘Mostly in a Listening Mode’,” 379.
- ⁵¹ Power, 380.
- ⁵² Power, 380.
- ⁵³ Power, 380.
- ⁵⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions Taken by the UN During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, S/1999/1257 (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 1999), 3, <https://undocs.org/S/1999/1257>.
- ⁵⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Independent Inquiry*, 3.

International Justice, is it real?

Alex Hibberd

There is an old saying that “time heals all wounds,” but what happens if those wounds are constantly reopened and brought back to the forefront of the wounded’s mind? As with most injuries, it then never heals, and will not until it has been left alone and the healing powers of time have worked their magic. The act of genocide is a truly despicable act, one for which justice can never truly be found. There is nothing that will bring back the lives that have been lost. Justice cannot truly be achieved by simply punishing an individual or individuals responsible. Yet, the United Nations still attempts to find some semblance of justice for the victims of genocide, which is, in its own way, quite admirable. However, the United Nations efforts, while admirable, fail to achieve their goal. This paper will show, using the international criminal courts in Nuremburg after World War Two and the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, why the United Nations is unable to truly find justice for the victims of genocide, and that its failure stems directly from its foundation as an international entity. The structure of the United Nations sets it up for failure before the trials even begin; then, once the trials have begun, its quest for justice is further cemented as a lost cause by its procedures. So, when the trials finally conclude and the guilty are punished, the United Nations tries to say that justice has been carried out, but to outsiders, the justice that they claim to have found seems to be nothing more than a show, aimed at justifying the existence of the United Nations.

After an act of genocide has been committed, and the United Nations is asked to conduct an investigation, the legal process is set in motion. Unfortunately, this process is incredibly slow, sometimes taking decades; picture a sloth trying to swim across a river of molasses, and you get how slow these criminal proceedings are. The speed of the trial has a strong impact on whether the United Nations achieves justice. In conducting an international trial, the

courts must balance following internationally accepted legal proceedings with not losing its impact by being too slow. An example of an international court losing its international impact due to slowness of the proceedings is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which was established in 1991 and is still active today, twenty-three years later.¹ There are many explanations for the longevity of this tribunal, including the fact that new defendants are still being brought before the courts. Ratko Mladic, a Serbian military leader between 1992 and 1995, is believed to have been one of the key figures behind the Srebrenica massacre.² The ‘Srebrenica massacre’ is the name given to an act committed by Bosnian Serbians against Bosnian Muslims that took place in the small town of Srebrenica in July 1995 and resulted in the deaths of more than seven thousand Muslim men, and the expulsion of over twenty thousand women and children from their homes.³ Ratko Mladic was only brought before the criminal tribunal in May 2012 because he could not be found by the authorities.⁴ This inability to find a crucial defendant is not the fault of the legal system, because there are numerous individuals who are able to escape the law every day. Criminals escaping from justice is exactly the reason why there are ‘most wanted’ lists from many judicial agencies, such as Interpol and the American Federal Bureau of investigations, both of which have very long lists of people who are still running from the justice system.⁵ Once a criminal is brought before the courts, it takes far too long to complete the trial. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic was considered one of the three Serbian leaders most responsible for the crimes for which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia sought justice.⁶ Milosevic was President of Yugoslavia until late 2000, which made arresting him very difficult; however, almost as soon as he was ousted from office in 2001, the Yugoslavian government turned him over to the international tribunal to stand trial.⁷ Milosevic’s trial began in

February of 2002 and concluded in March of 2006, only because Milosevic died of a heart attack in his cell.⁸ Milosevic's trial took four years and was suspended numerous times due to Milosevic's ailing health, primarily because Milosevic acted as his own defense lawyer.⁹ These apparently unavoidable delays in the legal system may seem to be protecting a defendant's legal rights to a fair trial; however, to quote William E. Gladstone "Justice delayed, is justice denied."¹⁰

The rights of the defendant in an international court are outlined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that was established in 1998.¹¹ Article sixty-seven of the Rome Statute outlines the rights of the accused during the trial process, including: guarantees of a swift and speedy trial and to be given access to the necessities required to properly prepare their defence; to be properly informed in their native language, to be present at trial, and essentially what would be considered a proper trial amongst human rights activists.¹² Article sixty-four, section two of the Rome Statute dictates that the Trial Chamber shall ensure that the trial is expeditious and abides by all the rights afforded to the defendant.¹³ These rights are designed to give the court an image of importance, and to negate the notion that these sorts of International trials are nothing more than show trials. However, there are legal clauses that would permit limiting these rights, which were not used in Milosevic's case. Article sixty-three, section two of the Rome Statute does allow for a circumvention of the accused's right to be present if there are special circumstances, such as the accused disrupting the trial proceedings, and are only allowed after reasonable alternatives have proved inadequate.¹⁴

There is another legal clause that allows the court to try the defendant *in absentia*. In absentia trials conclude that the defendant has waived their rights to be present at trial, and thus conduct the trial without them. This creates a very complex legal issue because essentially, the

court is asked to make an unbiased decision by only hearing one competent argument; because a defence attorney cannot make a competent argument if their client is unable to tell them their side of the story. Article sixty-three, section two would also provide the ability for courts to conduct proceedings with the defendant *in absentia*.¹⁵ This would suggest that the reason the United Nations does not continue with more trials in absentia has to do more with the aesthetics of justice. It is very difficult for people to see justice happening if there is no defendant to sit in the court room and defend themselves. An empty defendant's chair also eats away at the purpose of the trials themselves because it represents a level of ethics and humanity that were not afforded the victims of the defendant; and in conducting a trial like this, it shows that the civilized society is triumphing over the uncivilized criminal.

The United Nations' emphasis on due process with its more recent international tribunals is a response to the perception that arose out of the Nuremberg trials after World War Two, which some have criticized as being more theatrical than a trial should be. The Nuremberg trials were hastily created after World War Two to punish the Nazis for the atrocities they committed, and to show the public that justice was being served. These trials were essentially created out of nothing. Prior to the Nuremberg trials, there was no real conception of crimes against humanity and international criminal law.¹⁶ These trials were conducted with great haste and as such, made a few mistakes along the way. In 1945, twenty-two Nazis were put on trial for the crimes committed by Nazi Germany during World War Two. These twenty-two people represented varying degrees of involvement in the Nazi regime, and the verdicts rendered in these trials were equally vast in array, even if the verdict did not accurately represent the degree of involvement. Hermann Goering was Adolf Hitler's second in command, and his testimony at

trial reflected his loyalty; he was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to death by hanging.¹⁷

The cases of Albert Speer and Fritz Saukel represent a bumbling of justice in Nuremberg. Albert Speer was the Nazi minister for armaments and war production from 1942 to 1945; this title gave him authority over Germany's armaments production, transportation, and final authority over raw materials and industrial production, which included the utilization of slave labour supplied from the concentration camps.¹⁸ In fact, Speer was responsible for expanding the conscript and slave labour system that kept German military production running at peak capacity.¹⁹ Fritz Saukel was chief commissioner for the utilization of manpower, and in order to achieve his boss' desired production levels, he recruited slave labour by force and exploited their capacity for work.²⁰ Speer and Saukel's respective roles within the Nazi regime sound very similar: Saukel provided the slaves and Speer utilized the slaves. Yet, the verdicts rendered for these two men were very different, with Saukel receiving death and Speer being sentenced to twenty years in prison.²¹ Then, there is the case of Rudolf Hess. Rudolf Hess was a key figure in the rise of Hitler's Nazi party; he was the man who wrote down Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, yet by the time the war had begun, he was on his way out the door.²² Hess was brought before the Nuremberg courts despite the fact that under normal conditions, he would have been declared mentally unfit to stand trial; he had been suffering for long periods from paranoia and amnesia since his peace attempt in Britain in 1941.²³ Despite Hess' minimal involvement in the war, he was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.²⁴ The vast array of verdicts for the criminals on trial at Nuremberg reflect what can happen if due process is rushed; the trials convicted nineteen of the twenty-two Nazis put on trial in only eleven months.²⁵ The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has charged over 160 people, of which sixty-nine have been convicted

and twenty-five are in the midst of court proceedings in over twenty years of work.²⁶ There needs to be a balance between due process and taking far too long to bring justice to the victims; however, these are not even the biggest failures of the United Nations courts.

The biggest failure of the United Nations' attempts to bring justice to those affected by genocide is not that it struggles to find a balance between speed and ethics, it is that the United Nations is unable to stop genocide from happening in the future. Preventing genocide would ensure that no one else would suffer from it again. Some might suggest that, against this standard, the legal system as a whole fails because law can only provide a deterrent towards criminal acts. If there are people willing to ignore such deterrents, then there will always be crime. The difference between the national legal system and the international legal system is the fact that the national system has the capability to act as a deterrent, whereas the United Nations has no such capabilities. The United Nations does not have its own military or police force; instead, it relies on contributions from its member states.²⁷ Currently, the United Nations peacekeeping workforce consists of 84,182 serving troops and military observers; 12,705 police personnel; 5,128 international civilian personnel; 11,694 local civilian staff; and 2,001 volunteers provided by 117 countries.²⁸ Of those numbers, only 3396 members are provided by members of the G8, and of those numbers, only 220 are provided by Russia and the United States of America — arguably the two largest nations in the G8.²⁹ The top contributor to the United Nations Peacekeepers, in terms of military experts, is the mighty nation of Ethiopia, who contributes 105 military experts to the United Nations; the United States provides 6.³⁰ In terms of police contributions, Bangladesh leads the way, contributing 1823 police officers; Canada contributes ninety-one.³¹ Pakistan contributes the most troops, at 7,598 troops contributed; the United States contributes twenty-six.³² The point of this is that while the United Nations has a semblance of a

military and police force behind it, they are not being provided by the nations that rank in the upper echelons of military might. This lack of military strength, combined with the sheer fact that it has to be provided, makes it very difficult to intervene in conflicts where intervention is necessary. The lack of independent United Nations forces likely contributed to why Ratko Mladic was able to evade capture until 2011. Mladic is believed to have been helped by numerous people to remain hidden for fourteen years; many of these people were Serbian military officials and family members.³³ If the United Nations had the capacity to conduct its own independent search for Mladic, it may have uncovered the vast network that had been established within the Serbian military in order to keep him safe. Even if the United Nations had the capability to intervene, it could not because it is handicapped almost from the beginning of its charter.

Article 1, section 1 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that the purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, in conformity with the principles of international law.³⁴ This sounds like it really gives the United Nations a lot of power over the world and could be the international entity capable of bringing peace to the world; but then it essentially cuts its legs off in the next section. Article 1, section 2 of the Charter states that the United Nations must respect a nation's right to self-determination.³⁵ This means that the United Nations cannot act against a nation, unless it is invited by an involved party to do so, because it would interfere with that nation's right to self-determination. As a result of this clause, the United Nations cannot compel any nation to follow its directive; it can only sit on the side lines and make suggestions, and hope that enough nations agree with it in

order for action to take place. In fact, the only thing that the United Nations can do — and even this requires cooperation from its members — is create sanctions against a problematic nation, which really only works if the sanctioned nation finally relents to the force of the sanctions and gives in. When Slobodan Milosevic was indicted for his crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia in 1999, he was still President of Yugoslavia, but he did not appear in court until 2001.³⁶ The reason he was finally brought before the courts is because he was voted out of political office and turned over by his government. Prior to that, the United Nations could not bring him to court because the Yugoslavian government would not cooperate; Milosevic being President might have had something to do with why he was not put in front of a judge.

The United Nations' search for justice through International Criminal Tribunals seems like nothing more than self-serving propaganda. The trials can stretch on for decades when the tribunals strive to protect the defendants' rights to due process, which is necessary to preserve the integrity of the United Nations' quest for justice. However, when the trial is conducted too swiftly, it risks making a mockery of the legal system by making improper judgments. These issues would be far more relevant if the trials could be anything more than symbolic. Unfortunately, they cannot because the United Nations lacks the independence and military might necessary to act when it feels action is necessary. If the United Nations had the ability to act to prevent or at least minimize genocide, regardless of a nation's right to self-determination, then it could truly find justice for the victims of genocide. This inability to prevent genocide in and of itself makes the United Nations efforts to find justice for the victims difficult to see, and when compounded by their inability to hold meaningful and effective

criminal courts that appear to be nothing more than living theatre, the United Nations' search for justice for the victims of genocide is a failure.

Notes and References

¹ International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.icty.org/>.

² Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Ratko Mladic,” accessed 12 November 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1112680/Ratko-Mladic>.

³ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Srebrenica massacre,” accessed 12 November 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1697253/Srebrenica-massacre>.

⁴ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Srebrenica massacre.”

⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Wanted by the FBI,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.fbi.gov/wanted>; INTERPOL, “Wanted Persons,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.interpol.int/Wanted-Persons>.

⁶ Victoria Ward, “Serbian war criminals: Slobodan Milosevic profile,” *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/serbia/8538575/Serbian-war-criminals-Slobodan-Milosevic-profile.html>.

⁷ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Slobodan Milosevic,” accessed 12 November 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/383076/Slobodan-Milosevic>.

⁸ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Slobodan Milosevic.”; Ward, “Serbian war criminals.”

⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Slobodan Milosevic.”

¹⁰ William Gladstone, “Thoughts on the business of life,” *Forbes*, accessed 13 November 2013, <http://thoughts.forbes.com/thoughts/justice-william-e-gladstone-justice-delayed-is>.

¹¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, A/CONF.183/9 (last amended 2010) (Rome, IT: United Nations General Assembly, 1998), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html>.

¹² United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute*.

¹³ United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute*.

¹⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute*.

¹⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute*.

¹⁶ Tove Rosen, “The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on International Criminal Law,” Robert H. Jackson Center, accessed 13 November 2013, <https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law>.

¹⁷ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “war crime,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/635621/war-crime/224687/The-Nurnberg-and-Tokyo-trials>.

¹⁸ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Albert Speer,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/559185/Albert-Speer>.

¹⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Albert Speer.”

²⁰ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Fritz Sauckel,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/525321/Fritz-Sauckel>.

²¹ Richard Overy, “Nuremberg: Nazis on Trial,” *BBC History*, 17 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nuremberg_article_01.

²² Overy, “Nazis on Trial.”

²³ Overy, “Nazis on Trial.”

²⁴ Overy, “Nazis on Trial.”

²⁵ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Nürnberg trials,” accessed 11 November 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/422668/Nurnberg-trials>.

²⁶ International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “About the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY>.

²⁷ United Nations, “About Us,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/>.

²⁸ United Nations, “About Us.”

²⁹ Understanding the G8, “Members of the G8,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.g8.co.uk/members-of-the-g8/>; United Nations, “Troop and Police Contributors,” accessed 13 November 2013, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

³⁰ United Nations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”

³¹ United Nations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”

³² United Nations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”

³³ Julian Borger, “Ratko Mladic: the full story of how the general evaded capture for so long,” *The Guardian*, 2 April 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/02/ratko-mladic-life-run>.

³⁴ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1 UNTS XVI (San Francisco, CA: United Nations, 1945), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html>.

³⁵ United Nations, *Charter*.

³⁶ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Slobodan Milosevic.”

Nazi Propaganda: Perpetrators, Passivity, and Partisans

Chloe Betuik

The unprecedented brutality of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany undoubtedly raises numerous questions, especially relating to victims, survivors and perpetrators. As significant as these groups were, it was the German population and the international community who stood in shock as the post-war truth of the atrocities emerged. The Nazi Party, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and aided by Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, had swept the nation with a doctrine of Anti-Semitism and racial purity. Propaganda was a key element of the Nazi Regime, as it enabled Hitler to create an ‘us vs. them’ mentality. This began with the British as the target enemy but moved onto the Jewish with the invasion of the Soviet Union.¹ Nazis used propaganda to dehumanize the Jewish people, and essentially create an enemy for the “pure” German race. The Nazi Party flourished under doctrines of conformity, purity, and anti-Semitism. The Nazi Propaganda Machine defines how the Nazi government was able to carry out such a mass execution with little revolt or rebellion from the people. Resistance did exist, but it was increasingly prevalent in satellite states that had the ability to create ‘screens’ to hide the Jewish people. Within Nazi Germany, resistance was subject to the propaganda machine in determining success or failure. The propaganda issue is vital to understanding the interaction which existed between perpetrator and bystander experiences during the Holocaust. By looking at the Nazi Propaganda machine and anti-Semitism, this essay argues that the Nazi government deliberately facilitated the growth of a nation majorly composed of passive bystanders and active participants in the atrocities, with a limited and disabled sector of resistance within Nazi Germany, due to the extent of indoctrination.

Nazi propaganda was based on Hitler’s idea that the destruction of the Jews was Germany’s response to Jewish plans to destroy Germany.² Propaganda played upon historical anti-Semitism and focused on emotions rather than intellect. It was eye-catching and used “bold

print and slashing, violent lines as well as attention-getting headlines.”³ These characteristics of Nazi propaganda show a clear aim for mass influence and distribution. The content of the propaganda espouses the “vitriolic hatred of a perceived enemy, driven by the belief that self-preservation requires the elimination of that enemy.”⁴ The Jewish people were externalized and made into the scapegoat for Germany’s problems. This is essential to the effectiveness of Hitler’s ‘Final Solution’ because the goal of the enemy complex is to turn the immoral act of killing into a moral defense from the “evils” of the Jewish.



“Whoever wears this symbol is an enemy of our volk.”⁵

The emphasis on racial superiority and purity is seen in an SS document outlining Nazi racial policy and belief: “The worldview Adolf Hitler developed, based on these incontrovertible scientific results, enabled the greater part of our people to be persuaded of the correctness and decisive significance of racial thinking.”⁶ The language used in this document emphasizes the scientific “fact” of the Nazi doctrine, which disables readers’ critical analysis due to the inaccessibility of counterarguments.⁷ The Nazi regime had all mass media and journalism under their control, which made it nearly impossible for Germans to access accurate information.⁸ Media was meticulously controlled and “a common tactic was to attack the press (especially the foreign press) as liars and atrocity-mongers, thus leading German citizens to believe that any report unfavourable to the regime was biased.”⁹ This is significant as it espouses the mentality that all others were enemies. The Germans lived in a state under complete Nazi control, with little access to information that countered the Nazi doctrine, which created a society composed of perpetrators and disabled bystanders.

Film propaganda was substantial due to its ability to reach a multitude of people, in combination with its emotional capabilities stemming from imagery and story. This is championed in Fritz Hippler’s 1940 pseudo-documentary *Der ewige Jude* (The Eternal Jew).¹⁰ The documentary style of this film created an effect of “cool objectivity,” and it culminated with Hitler’s 30 January, 1939 speech to the Reichstag on the extermination of the Jews.¹¹ The climax of this film featured a depiction of a kosher ritual slaughter, which is “but an allegory for the fate that is awaiting the Jews who are, in the Nazi view, no better than the animals that they themselves have been killing.”¹² This shows the dehumanizing nature of the “documentary,” which goes hand-in-hand with the creation of a Jewish enemy for the “pure” Aryans. Since this film was presented as a documentary, it is evidence of the capability of the

propagandists to indoctrinate the public at the same time as they reduce the capacity for critical thought. By looking at a poster for this film, it is evident that *The Eternal Jew* was dehumanized and demonized.



Dehumanizing of the “enemy” was significant in creating both bystanders and perpetrators.¹³

Despite the apparent differences between these groups, they share a common root as products of the Nazi Propaganda machine. In Bornstein and Milton’s 1942 book, *Action Against the Enemy’s Mind*, they look at High Nazi Officials and their response to talk of anti-Semitism: “if they sought for an excuse at all- they described the brutal excesses of their Party against the Jews as a ‘regrettable necessity.’”¹⁴ This highlights the extent of indoctrination because it shows these officials either felt no need to excuse their genocidal actions, or they saw them as indispensable. This radical Nazi minority was “operating in a society with a less radical but broad anti-Semitic consensus, a consensus broad enough to render people indifferent to rumors and facts of varying clarity indicating that mass murder was taking place.”¹⁵ This indicates the nature of the general society as deeply indoctrinated with anti-Semites, to the point that they

overlook evidence of the Holocaust. Both groups were made to feel that extreme action was necessary to rid Germany of its “enemy”. Bystanders develop as a result of propaganda, and psychologist Ervin Staub explains how they then become passive, by stating that:

Bystanders to the ongoing, usually progressively increasing mistreatment of a group of people have great potential power to influence events. However, whether individuals, groups, or nations, they frequently remain passive. This allows perpetrators to see their destructive actions as acceptable and even right. As a result of their passivity in the face of others’ suffering, bystanders change: they come to accept the persecution and suffering of victims, and some even join the perpetrators.¹⁶

This relationship between bystander passivity and perpetrator violence is a significant aspect of the ‘who’ of genocide. Staub looks at how these two groups play off each other as enablers of violence through ignorance and general acceptance. Both groups have ideals founded on deeply ingrained elements of Nazi propaganda, which created the base for the atrocities of the Holocaust.

Hitler and his propaganda machine played on the sense of group mentality. In examination of rallies and propaganda films, this is evident with the portrayal of large crowds. These crowds were always avid supporters of Nazism, shown through the solidarity of the Nazi salute in combination with cheering.¹⁷ A newsreel in The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum archive titled “Hitler Supporters Parade in Rain” espouses the portrayal of support through propaganda.¹⁸ These supporters went out in the rain to parade for Hitler, which would show dedication to the cause and avid devotion to Hitler himself. In turn, propaganda like this would indicate to viewers that Hitler’s doctrine was truth because his supporters were willing to brave the elements in order to show their loyalty. This type of propaganda advocated the social consensus and produced the logic that if one was not already a supporter of Hitler, they should become one, since

everyone else was. Passive bystander experiences are privy to the social consensus and underpinned by propaganda of the masses.

For passive bystanders, the root of this passivity often came from disbelief of evidence presented, and “this denial of reality was an ultimate defense mechanism in a destructive universe.”¹⁹ The severity of the atrocities which took place under the Nazi regime was unprecedented, which produced an inability to grasp the concept that the rumors were indeed reality. The anti-Semitic aura of Hitler’s party was mythic and “‘self-confirming’: once a person was trapped within it, it became reality.”²⁰ This indicates how anti-Semitism maintained the capabilities of the Nazi Party. Once they indoctrinated their people, then it became reality to them as well, and thus it became easier for Hitler to work toward his ‘Final Solution’. By producing this enemy complex and blaming the Jewish for World War One, Hitler created an emotional and personal connection for those who had lost loved ones during this war. This connection then offered an intimate reason for retaliation, and “for millions of Germans, the abstract slogan ‘the Jews are guilty’ assumed direct emotional significance.”²¹ This is significant as it shows guilt association combined with intense personal emotion as a foundation for disbelief or willful ignorance. This guilt complex manifested as a platform for retaliation, and as an indication that perpetrators were justified in their actions, which enabled supportive bystanders. Propaganda was accountable for the fact that passive bystanders denied the atrocities, and supportive bystanders justified the cause.

The resistance sector in Nazi Germany was limited, disabled and repressed due to the intense propaganda and terror of the regime. One example of such disablement, due to indoctrination, concerns the Jewish firm Schwab and boycotting activities. The company

owners wrote a letter about their concern for posted signs with slogans such as “‘The Jews are our misfortune’ and ‘whoever buys from Jews is a traitor to the people.’”²² The writer states that this results in a severe decline of business. The district government and the district head of propaganda both have letters of reply which deny all accusations by the brothers. The influence of the anti-Semitic doctrine is seen in their defense of the signs stating “‘The Jews are our misfortune’, as ‘There can be no objection to such signs that are merely stating a fact.’”²³ These letters show an attempt at resistance by Jewish business owners against anti-Semitism, and how the propaganda minister completely negates their claims. The defense of the signs as “fact” clearly espouses the deep-seated values of the Nazi anti-Semitism, and indicates how this forms repression.



“SA men in front of a Jewish-owned store urge a boycott with the signs reading ‘Germans! Defend Yourself! Don’t buy from Jews!’ Berlin, Germany, April 1, 1933.”²⁴

Resistance within Germany was not always futile, and there are examples of successful protest. On February 27, 1943, hundreds of Jewish males were arrested during factory work. They were targeted because of their non-Jewish wives. These wives gathered

outside a detention center in Berlin, on the same street as the Gestapo headquarters for Jewish affairs, and chanted for six days, demanding their husbands be released. On March 6, they began to release the men, and Goebbels wrote in his journal that the action against these men was stopped due to the public protest.²⁵ This espouses both the power of resistance and the importance of uniformity to the Nazi party. They could not stand this kind of a show of public dissent, and since the women were Aryan, it made it difficult to crush the protest.

Race and religion in Nazi Germany play a central role in determining the success of resistance. The first example of the Jewish business owner looking for respite for his faltering business saw no success and ultimate denial of wrong, but the Aryan women in public protest were successful. This boils down to the propaganda issue. The Jewish business which was boycotted with anti-Semitic signs would be positive propaganda to the Nazi party, as it furthered their doctrine and disabled Jewish people. On the other hand, the dissenters in the center of Berlin were an example of non-uniform belief among the non-Jewish Germans, and thus their success is understandable as a mechanism of propaganda. In order to maintain appearances, then there must not be public evidence of dissatisfaction with the regime, especially among the “pure” and “uniform” Aryan race.

Propaganda was imperative to the Nazi regime. The message of the propaganda was clear in its anti-Semitic portrayal of the Jewish people as the root of all problems. This creation of an enemy for the Germans gave perpetrators a reason for their violence and gave bystanders a reason to look away. This doctrine was deeply ingrained into all aspects of German life, and it created a mob mentality and the idea of social consensus. Film propaganda also played a significant role in the dehumanization of the Jewish,

especially *The Eternal Jew*, with its documentary-style. This style was characteristic of Nazi propaganda, as it purposed that Nazism was truth, and with little accessible evidence to the contrary, it was seen as such. Resistance to the Nazi policy in Germany was not major, due to the severity of indoctrination and violence repression. Success in attempted resistance was rare for the Jewish but had a better chance when it came from those in a better position in society. The Nazi Propaganda machine created a society of conformity and proposed uniformity of belief. Hitler used historical anti-Semitism to create an enemy scapegoat, and thus rationalized his 'Final Solution.' The doctrine of the Nazi party enabled perpetrators to feel their actions were necessary and created bystanders who were ignorant to the injustice, supportive of it, or suppressed beyond capabilities for resistance. The extreme anti-Semitism of the Nazi propaganda created an enemy complex, gave bystanders and participants justification, and limited resistance efforts.

Notes and References

- ¹ Randall Bytwerk, "The Argument for Genocide in Nazi Propaganda," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 91, no. 1 (2005): 42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00335630500157516>.
- ² Bytwerk, "The Argument for Genocide," 41.
- ³ Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2000), 319.
- ⁴ Daniel Rothbart and Karina V. Korostelina, *Why They Die: Civilian Devastation in Violent Conflict* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 182.
- ⁵ Michel Reynders, *Nazi propaganda poster with a picture of a Jewish star and a German caption that reads, "Whoever wears this symbol is an enemy of our Volk."*, 1942, poster, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1155552>
- ⁶ Randall Bytwerk, "Der Reichsführer SS/SS-Hauptamt, *Rassenpolitik*," 1943, German Propaganda Archive, Berlin, Germany, <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/rassenpo.htm>.
- ⁷ Jeffrey Herf, "The "Jewish War": Goebbels and the Antisemitic Campaigns of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry," *Holocaust Genocide Studies* 19, no. 1 (2005): 53.
- ⁸ Jeffrey Herf, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 138.
- ⁹ Pratkanis and Aronson, *Age of Propaganda*, 320-1.
- ¹⁰ Bytwerk, "The Argument for Genocide," 14.
- ¹¹ Pratkanis and Aronson, *Age of Propaganda*, 190-1, 204.
- ¹² Pratkanis and Aronson, 204.
- ¹³ Max Reid, *An antisemitic poster entitled, "Behind the enemy powers: the Jew."*, 1933-39, poster, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1164720>.
- ¹⁴ Joseph Bornstein and Paul R. Milton, *Action Against the Enemy's Mind* (New York, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Publishers, 1942), 98.
- ¹⁵ Herf, "The "Jewish War"," 53.
- ¹⁶ Ervin Staub, *The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 292.
- ¹⁷ Pratkanis and Aronson, *Age of Propaganda*, 321.
- ¹⁸ Hitler Supporters Parade in Rain, 200 UN 5-128-2, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn1000330>.
- ¹⁹ Jacques Semelin, *Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939-1943*, trans. Suzan Husserl-Kapit (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 136.
- ²⁰ Herf, "The "Jewish War"," 53.
- ²¹ Herf, 68.
- ²² Boycotting Activity in Neustadt am Aisch, M1DN 207, Yad Vashem Archives, Soah Resource Centre: The International School for Holocaust Studies, 2, https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203269.pdf.
- ²³ Boycotting Activity, 2-3.
- ²⁴ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Members of the SA During the Boycott of Jewish-Owned Businesses*, 1 April 1933, photograph, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media_ph.php?ModuleId=10005678&MediaId=2680
- ²⁵ Semelin, *Unarmed Against Hitler*, 142-3.

The Sexual Nature of the Rwandan Genocide and the Lifelong Struggle

Jessica Chu

Rwanda is a small, densely populated country caught between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi. The Rwandan genocide started in 1994; an estimated five hundred thousand Rwandan people were killed from April 7th to July 15th. The Rwandan genocide claimed many lives, but many also survived. By looking at Rwandan survivor testimonies, this essay argues that methods of the Rwandan genocide were damaging as a lifelong experience and a continuous struggle. The nature of the violence from this genocide shows a struggle of HIV/AIDS, unwanted pregnancies and the resulting unwanted children. It is important to analyze different genocides to understand that each genocide is unique and cannot be categorized into one idea or statement. By learning about the methods of tortures, killings, and types of violence, historians can better understand the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

In the small country of Rwanda, two main tribes exist: Hutu and Tutsi. They have had a long history of coexistence and struggle. More than seven and a half million people live in Rwanda. The stage is set; the country's population was undergoing massive movement, which caused large refugee groups all over the country. The buildup of severe economic crisis added to the flame, and stalled democracy fueled the country with impatience and rage. In Rwanda, ethnic polarization was ever present between the Hutu tribe and Tutsi tribe.¹ Historically, the Tutsis were often in power positions over the Hutus. The trigger to the genocide was when President Habyarimana and some members of his administration were shot down in a plane April 6, 1994. Seeking revenge, Habyarimana extremists started to exterminate the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutu people.² Several theories arose when the president was killed because no group came forward claiming responsibility. The Rwandan government and military believed the Rwandan Patriotic Front shot them down. The international community

accepted that Habyarimana's own government killed him. The Forces Armées Rwandaises, and especially the Presidential Guard, were responsible for many, if not most, of the killings. Over one hundred days, the Hutus managed to massacre upwards of five hundred thousand Rwandan people. The war ended in July 1994, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front captured Kigali, defeating the Forces Armées Rwandaises and putting in power a new government. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Hutus fled the country in fear of vengeance by the Tutsi.

Surviving genocide cannot be described justly in one essay, article or witness testimony. After reading several primary sources of the stories of survivors, there is nothing that describes the feelings, emotions, pain and suffering a survivor undergoes. Adeline, nineteen years old at the start of the genocide, describes how her family split up, scattering to other countries, while some remained hiding in Rwanda. She describes how they passed roadblocks where they watched person after person forced to squat down and killed with machetes. Once the men got tired of killing, she depicts the scene: "The men came to us and ordered us to take off our clothes. They each in turn raped us. One man pleaded with the others to leave my 14 years old sister alone, saying she was only a kid. The other men laughed and said, that we were all going to be killed anyway."³ Her story was unfortunately like many other women; Adoline, Alexandria, Alice, Dianne, the names go on with similar, but each one horrific, stories. Chantal, who was also nineteen years old at the time of the genocide, describes her neighbors attacking her: "I went to school with their children. I considered them as parents. They did not beat me or speak to me. After raping me they left me for dead to go and find more people to kill."⁴ Daphrose, a twelve-year-old girl at the time the genocide started: "My parents and other members of my family were killed right before my eyes."⁵ Historians will find that testimony after testimony shows young girls witnessing the torturing and murdering of family. Trauma, some may think, is experienced

differently from person to person. One source explores the effects of trauma and how people experience it; more specifically, it looks into children who survived the genocide. The author quotes that "... extreme traumatization resulting from unexpected, abnormal events is experienced in similar ways, regardless of culture."⁶ This solidifies that no matter the race, religion, or nationality, trauma is generally experienced in a similar manner. What does vary from person to person is how to deal or regulate with the anxieties following the trauma. The stories of hundreds of survivors will never be enough to understand the emotions and pain involved with watching loved ones massacred by friends and neighbors; nothing can match the suffering of survivors, but the best historians can do is learn and explore the genocides. The responsibility to continue to read about them, allowing them to live on and be shared for future generations, is incredibly important. The torture, killings, and the permanent nightmares will forever live on in the hearts and minds of every surviving individual.

Each genocide has many different facets, and each genocide is unique. The Rwandan genocide exhibited a large amount of sexual violence, which is intimate in the nature of violence. One article coins the Rwandan genocide an "intimate genocide."⁷ After reading several survivor testimonies, it is not difficult to take notice of how many female names and stories are on file in comparison to males. There are many female Rwandan genocide survivors due to the nature of violence: rape. An estimated two hundred thousand women were victims of sexual violence.⁸ As explored in one article, sexual abuse was used as a weapon to humiliate the Tutsi people as a group. By destroying or devastating their women, the Hutu were in power and superior to the Tutsi tribe.⁹ One woman explained that she was taken as a sex slave; she describes the Hutu soldiers gangbanging her several times a day. She, along with several other women, were subject to this kind of abuse. Another story recounts how soldiers would keep

young women in huts to rape nightly. She explains that when women became pregnant, “The killers boasted that if she had a baby boy they would kill the baby. Luckily the baby was a girl.”¹⁰ Interahamwe militia sexually abused the Tutsi women in public and/or in front of family, forcing them to bear unspeakable shame and suffering. Women who underwent such treatment became sex slaves; these were women who were used daily for sex, among several men throughout the days of the genocide. Many women were not only taken as sex slaves, but also as wives whom Hutu men could abuse physically and sexually. Dianne, a fourteen-year-old girl at the time, illustrates her sister being taken as a wife, but later was also victimized by the same man: “Several times he raped me in front of my sister, who could do nothing but cry.”¹¹ Some women were sexually mutilated, others suffered from chronic pain and many more were at risk of STIs, HIV, and the resulting AIDS. To make matters worse, among the surviving communities, hundreds if not thousands of women became unwillingly pregnant with their attacker’s child. These women living in communities in Africa, or more specifically Rwanda, were constantly ostracized from society and what remaining family they may have had. Women who have been sexually abused are identified as “the living dead.”¹² An estimated five thousand children were born as a result of rape. These children are often referred to as ‘children of bad memories,’ ‘devil’s children,’ or ‘little Interahamwe.’ Lest not we forget that during the genocide, there were RPF soldiers in the country doing the same to Hutu women as a method to fight back. What many may not consider when researching and studying genocides, is that these women, Tutsi or Hutu, may have survived due to being used as sexual objects. As sickening as it is, it is important to understand that in this genocide, thousands of women survived due to their sex. Unlike men, women could be taken hostage, used, and abused, which in some horrible way, allowed them to survive. The Hutu massacres were intended to eliminate the possibility of a new

generation of Tutsi. This is important to point out because when learning about and understanding the Rwandan genocide, it shows that although it shares similarities with other genocides, each genocide is different. “Almost every Rwandan woman has a dramatic story of hunger and deprivation, fear, flight, and loss of family and friends.”¹³ In the case of the Rwandan genocide, thousands were killed, but thousands were also saved by using their bodies. Sexual violence is not exclusively used in the Rwandan genocide, but it is an unavoidable subject when reading primary sources. The intimacy of this violence demonstrates the close contact and personal attacks that survivors endured.

During the genocide, many girls survived due to sexual violence, but boys and men were killed off quickly. Most Rwandan boys who survived the genocide were left for dead or somehow escaped. Thousands of boys watched their fathers and brothers brutally killed, and forever lived in intense fear of dying themselves.¹⁴ Interahamwe militia targeted men and boys mostly because they posed a threat to their forces and could not be used. Hundreds of boys were severely attacked and were left for dead but strangely survived. These surviving boys defied the odds and lived to see another day, and remained hidden until the end of the genocide. One boy describes when the militia caught him and demanded he do impossible feats, all in the hopes of torturing and humiliating the boys.¹⁵ An article more deeply explores the effects on the boys who survived the genocide. During interviews with several male survivors, the author describes this well: “We are reminded that genocide is about situations that we cannot imagine in experiencing ourselves, unique in the collective descent into an unimaginable primitivity of affect.”¹⁶ Research among these boys also shows that traumatized people, like genocide survivors, can no longer habituate. On the technical side of it, it means that a person’s central nervous system cannot block out stimuli that is deemed nonthreatening; “This means that fear prevails among

traumatized people.”¹⁷ In this research, one can generalize to both sexes and to all people who have suffered severe trauma. Many of the boys in the interviews exhibit a distancing method. They deny the impact of their own horrific stories. They show a rapid fluctuation in emotions, which can be constructive and productive in some behaviors, but not in others. The boys also exhibit a sense of attachment issues; the sense of abandonment was the most painful situation. “Where would I go when I know nobody on this earth?” the sense of having nothing left in the world, the idea that everything and anything they do is not worth it, except for those who care for them.¹⁸ Surviving the genocide as a boy or a girl differentiates in types of trauma: for women, it is the sexual violence; for men, it is the brutality of the violence and learning to live on for a purpose.

Whether a woman or man survives the genocide, the aftermath is unbearable, and the aid is insufficient and utterly inadequate. With a lack of government aid and limited external help, the people who survived have a hard time surviving in the aftermath of genocide. The hurt, the distrust, and the indescribable feelings are all over the map from person to person. Exploring further into the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide will improve our understanding of why this genocide causes suffering in the long term. When the genocide ended, eight hundred thousand of the people who were formerly exiled returned to Kigali. Mass movements of people proved to be an excessive burden on the government’s social services. The government had a big job dealing with major challenges because of their lack of government. The end of the 1990s proved to have a fairly equal mix of both Tutsi and Hutu population, which each had their own sense of uncertainty of violence and sorrow.¹⁹ The atmosphere of a country post-genocide can never be justly described; what was left behind in the path of ruins is always unique. For the people, social trust was gone, women more than anything felt isolated and abandoned. Trusting people beyond

their own immediate family was a challenge. “We have suffered (twarababaye). The men made war, and the women suffer.” It is estimated that five million women were widowed due to the genocide.²⁰ “We felt as if we had lost all, as if we had been stripped of our skin. People lacked food, clothing, housing.”²¹ According to the Rwandan Association of Genocide Widows and the Survivors Fund, there has been insufficient aid for the widows of the genocide. Returning to the ruins of their homes and cities proved challenging without reliving the past. This shows how women resented men who began this war; yet the women are left in the dust to live on and fix the country, long after the men are gone. The men from the genocide on one side are killed off, and on the other side have fled. For those men fortunate enough to survive, it is a burden on women to support them while in prison, as well as their children and their own well-being. The genocide left thousands of women abandoned and thousands of children, the future generations, orphaned. Post-genocide, there was a massive pressure on women to repopulate the country. Contrarily, many women were left with unwanted and unaided children as a result of rape. The genocide only reinforced the subordination of women.²² Medical aid was slim to none; thousands were left sexually assaulted without access to treatment. There are countless women who are still suffering from trauma and are left with few resources, like antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS. This being said, it is important to understand that although the genocide took so many lives during its one hundred days in 1994, there are still lives being taken to this day. For those infected with STIs and viruses like HIV and AIDS, life is a never-ending battle. Testing is inaccessible for most, and so many find it pointless because they are unable to access treatment if positive.²³ How can the Rwandan government or international courts say the Rwandan genocide is over, when numerous women go on unaided and die? There is clear evidence that after the

Rwandan genocide, the people, more specifically women, are in dire need of medical attention and financial support.

Some say truth-telling is therapeutic and helps bring victims to closure, that allows them to come to peace. After reading so much about the suffering and struggle to survive in the world to this date, one article about the Rwandan genocide stood out. The idea that truth-telling and sharing your traumatic story somehow allows you to let it go was researched. Findings found that witnesses at the National Service of Gacaca Courts in Rwanda back in 2006 are not helpful. Gacaca was one of the largest, officially driven, truth and reconciliation process in the world. It is not to say that these courts are useless, but they do not aid victims to overcome their emotions and lifelong struggles. Reports show that witnesses of the Gacaca court have higher levels of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. The study seems to suggest that witnessing and reliving the trauma may worsen the effects of depression and PTSD, that they actually become re-traumatizing. It also explores that post-traumatic stress disorder does not decrease over years. By prolonging the memory and involvement of the genocide, it also prolongs and refreshes the memory of the suffering.²⁴ Truth-telling in courts should not be dismissed, but it is not a helpful tool to heal victims of extreme trauma such as genocide. This may be important for future generations, to know to better prepare and address witnesses in genocide court cases. Another article supports this idea that recounting the story does not aid in the healing process. Victims of the Rwandan genocide find commemorations of the event often force these people to relive their experiences. It becomes so extreme they can collapse from fear and crying. They often express that all year round, they work hard to repress the vivid images and are only reminded during commemoration, causing more suffering.²⁵



“Genocide memorial garden at the Kigali Memorial Centre, Kigali, Rwanda.” ²⁶

The Rwandan genocide is like no other: witnessing mass killings or personal killings by friends and family, the sexual violence used, like rape, the children who barely survived and the mountain of consequences that follow. Nothing can compare to the emotions felt by a victim of the genocide watching a father or brother struck to the ground. There is no comparison to a victim of genocide watching their sister endure innumerable accounts of rape. No one person can quite identify with a child, abandoned and alone, learning to fend for themselves. Insufficient aid to those who survived the genocide and excessive societal stigma to cope with seems impossible. Women in Rwanda have endured rape, STIs, HIV/AIDS, unwanted pregnancies and children, and psychological disorders like depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. It is evident that the Rwandan genocide not only affected the Rwandan women, but also resulted in a permanent lifelong struggle.

Notes and References

- ¹ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath: Women in Postgenocide Rwanda*, by Catharine Newbury and Hannah Baldwin, Working Paper no. 303 (Washington, DC: PDF, 2000), 2, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacj323.pdf.
- ² United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 2.
- ³ United Nations, “Survivor Testimonies,” Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations, accessed 25 October 2013, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/survivortestimonies.shtml>.
- ⁴ United Nations, “Survivor Testimonies.”
- ⁵ United Nations, “Survivor Testimonies.”
- ⁶ Suzanne Kaplan, “Child Survivors of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and Trauma-Related Affect,” *Journal of Social Issues* 69, no. 1 (2013): 94, <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12005>.
- ⁷ Karen Brounéus, “The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 3 (2010): 413, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709360322>.
- ⁸ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 4.
- ⁹ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 4.
- ¹⁰ United Nations, “Survivor Testimonies.”
- ¹¹ United Nations, “Survivor Testimonies.”
- ¹² United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 4.
- ¹³ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 3.
- ¹⁴ Kaplan, “Child Survivors,” 99.
- ¹⁵ Kaplan, 99.
- ¹⁶ Kaplan, 98.
- ¹⁷ Kaplan, 99.
- ¹⁸ Kaplan, 102.
- ¹⁹ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 3.
- ²⁰ Judith Mandelbaum-Schmid, “Rwandan genocide survivors in need of HIV treatment,” *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 82, no. 6 (2004): 472, <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15356944/>.
- ²¹ United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 3.
- ²² United States Agency for International Development, *Aftermath*, 6.
- ²³ Mandelbaum-Schmid, “Rwandan genocide survivors,” 472.
- ²⁴ Brounéus, “Trauma of Truth Telling,” 427.
- ²⁵ Kaplan, “Child Survivors,” 104-5.
- ²⁶ Colleen Taugher, *Genocide memorial garden at the Kigali Memorial Centre, Kigali, Rwanda*, n.d., digital image, Encyclopedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/National-recovery>.

Sexual Violence and Rape in Genocide

Charlotte Snair

“This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead.”¹ In genocide, not only are the traditional ideas of violence inflicted upon the victims, but there are unfortunately countless examples of rape during these genocides in history as well. Genocide is defined as *“acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”* by the United Nations.²

The term ‘genocidal rape’ is used to describe the act of rape and sexual misconduct on a mass scale during conflict against who is seen as the enemy. Rape and sexual violence during these events are often widely accepted as just another spoil of war, in which the intent is not only to kill the enemy but to seriously injure, enslave, humiliate and sexually assault the victim over and over again, until they are either dead or wish they were. It can also be used as a way to eliminate a race and produce children who are at least half a part of the “superior race” involved.

Those who manage to survive genocide and genocidal rape are left severely injured, not only emotionally but physically as well; contracting HIV and other diseases as a result of their rape, for which the crime all too often goes unpunished. The concept of using rape as genocide is a highly contested debate, with some arguments which state that it is merely a byproduct of war, while others feel that it is a carefully planned, pre-determined strategy of war, used to dehumanize and humiliate victims as much as possible. This paper will explore the concept of rape as genocide and argue that it is not just an unfortunate occurrence during conflicts, but in fact is a deliberate military strategy, with examples from the forgotten genocide of the Bangladesh Liberation Wars and the Rwandan Genocide.

After the partition of India, the new state of Pakistan emerged with two parts separated by Indian Territory.³ Not only did miles of land separate these two parts of Pakistan, but they were also extremely culturally different. Those who resided in the western wing of Pakistan felt that the Bengali people living in the eastern wing were inferior to themselves. Though they were ‘Bengali Muslims,’ their application of the Muslim religion did not make them equal to those living in the West. The citizens of East Pakistan were the larger population compared to the

West, and while the vast majority of them were Muslims, some were Hindu, Buddhists and Christians,⁴ yet they were still considered to be of a lower class than the Western population.

Following the partition into the new state, the Governor General at the time, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, decided to make Urdu the state's national language, though less than half of the population actually spoke it. He declared anyone who was Bengali or supported them as the enemy and traitors of their state.⁵ The tensions were formed between the differing ethnic groups and the systematic ethnic cleansing began in 1971, lasting nine months and reportedly taking the lives of three million minorities, while the additional hundreds of thousands of women and children were raped and sexually mutilated.

What marks the Bangladesh Genocide, aside from the horrendous conflict which took so many peoples' lives, is the planned, systematic, and supported use of rape and torture during the violence. During the first phase of the conflict, intellectuals, mainly men, were targeted.⁶ The Pakistan army also continued to capture, torture, and kill boys and men of all ages, intellectual or not, as they were seen as the enemy who could eventually support the Bengali movement. In the second phase of the Liberation wars, the focus shifted to young girls and women. The army began a campaign of mass rape and sexual assault against females, often kidnapping them and placing them in Pakistan military camps, where they could imprison them and they could be raped by a multitude of soldiers over days, weeks, and even months.

In the *Nine Months to Freedom* documentary on the Bangladesh Liberation Wars, a young girl is filmed, whose brother was a student leader who is ultimately targeted by militia and murdered. This left her vulnerable to be kidnapped by the militia, where she was imprisoned for months in a Pakistan military camp where multiple soldiers raped her daily. She escaped eventually, despite having a bullet lodged in her head. Tragically, she died in a refugee hospital

before the documentary was completed. Her story has a similar fate to what many women and girls faced during the war period, where it is estimated that anywhere from two hundred thousand to four hundred thousand women and girls were raped and sexually assaulted.⁷

There is plenty of evidence to support the theory that these rapes were not just an unfortunate addition to the violence against people in the conflict, but actually a supported and purposeful war tactic, perpetuated against the victims of war. Muslim religious leaders claimed openly that Bengali women should be taken as “war booty,” and that the torture and rape of women during the war was the duty of Pakistan soldiers.⁸

While there are cases in which men commit rape during ethnic conflicts for alternate reasons such as pleasure or power, generally speaking, rape is used deliberately to secure social, territorial, political and military advantages during conflicts. It is frequently employed during these ethnic wars because of its devastating short-term and long-term effects on entire families and communities, not just individuals. “Rapists speak of the experience as an aggressive act of dominance, associated with power, rather than as a particularly sexual act.”⁹ In order to exact power over an entire gender or ethnic group, in addition to the particular act of rape itself, sexual mutilation, as well as torture, is employed during ethnic wars to increase the sexual nature of the violence.



“Refugees flee toward India through a subdistrict in East Pakistan’s Comilla District (now Bangladesh), 1971.”¹⁰

As the basic definition of genocide can mean crimes such as murdering, torturing or causing extreme bodily harm to a person, the shift to add rape as an explicit part of the definition of genocide has occurred. As we discussed in our class this semester, the ICTY or the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia declared that rape is a crime against humanity, as well as a war crime and a “constituent part of genocide.”¹¹ Sexual violence and mass rape in particular are used as a strategy of genocide because they can bring about physical destruction of the group through the desecration of individuals.¹²

When the concept of rape and violence through sexual means occurs in genocides, it can be exceptionally catastrophic for the victims of the conflict. It instils an extreme sense of dehumanization of citizens, submission and most importantly, fear. In doing research for this project, I came across an idea put forth by the ‘Doctors Without Borders’ movement, which in my opinion, illustrates the true effect of genocidal rape exceptionally well. Survivors of rape and sexual abuse in any form causes many victims to be unable or unwilling to return to the places in which the assaults occurred, as this brings about an extreme traumatic experience for the individual. Often making many sexual crimes go unreported and unprosecuted. When genocidal or mass rape occurs throughout an entire country in which those who survive have to live after the conflict, “these assaults on individual women come to represent an assault on the community.”¹³

The traumatic experience of rape is most often purposefully intensified by perpetrators, through tactics discussed earlier, to send a direct and specific message. Though endless forms of abuse, forced pregnancies, abortions and childbirths are damaging to victims, they are frequently combined with torturing the survivor’s family, public humiliation, large, organized slaughters, looting, and forced starvation to further the suffering of the racially “inferior” group. The issue of mass rape has become more and more mainstream through studying different conflicts. With regard to the Bangladesh Genocide, the first wave was targeted at men being the intellectuals and the most dangerous to Pakistan Militia; it eventually shifts to a larger and more devastating focus on women and young girls.

The reason for this, according to recent scholars, is because women are becoming more than a spoil of war or an insignificant victim caught in genocide. Instead, it is being argued that these civilian women are the commodities that these ethnic wars are waged with, because they

can be used in various strategic ways. While so many lives are lost in genocides, including leaders and intellectuals, the loss of women is particularly devastating as well. They are in fact significant because of their important role in families, as well as in the social structure as a whole, making them an efficient entity to be disposed of for maximum annihilation of communities. Though not a ‘forgotten genocide,’ a recent and disturbing example of sexual violence in genocide is the Rwanda Genocide.

After decades of tension caused by Belgian colonization, the two strikingly similar ethnic groups in Rwanda, the Hutu and the Tutsi, came to a violent head in 1994.¹⁴ Between April and July of that year, approximately eight hundred thousand Rwandans were killed, the majority being Tutsi, by Hutu militia groups. What this genocide is known for is the way in which the civilians were murdered, which shocked the public. While the atrocities committed during genocides cannot be compared as being worse to one another, the majority of those who died during the four-month long reign of terror were hacked to death publicly with machetes and makeshift weapons by their own communities, neighbours and at times even family members.¹⁵

What is important to note, and is often under-looked or too disturbing to discuss, is the amount of rape and sexual violence as genocide that occurred in addition of the other forms of violence in Rwanda. As in Bangladesh, rape in Rwanda was not used for the satisfaction of the perpetrators, but instead as a way to systematically dehumanize and humiliate Tutsi women. “Rape was the rule and its absence was the exception”¹⁶ is evidence that the vast majority of Tutsi women and girls were raped during the genocide, either as a way to immediately enforce death through rape, with weapons such as sharpened sticks and machetes, or as a way to slowly kill and torture victims as they were enslaved and raped countless times.

As explored earlier, ‘genocidal rape’ is rape on a mass scale, with the intentional goal being to ethnically cleanse and eliminate a population in the most heinous way possible. The other “benefit” to employing this strategy, especially with regard to Rwanda, is the number of pregnancies that occurred from it. Because the rapes were being executed by Hutu men, the babies being born to Tutsi women from it would still be Hutu due to the fact that, legally speaking, a child’s ethnicity was determined by the father of the child, not the mother. This is also the reason why there are documented cases of Tutsi women being slaughtered by their family members who were Hutu men, illustrating how close and intertwined these ethnic groups were.

Not only was rape widespread during the Rwandan Genocide, but sexual mutilation was extremely frequent as well. Focused mostly on women, militia members would hack with machetes, as well as pour acid and boiling water on women’s genitals,¹⁷ demonstrating a complete disregard for Tutsi women as human beings. While rape was often committed by militia men to enforce power structures, they also used it as the ultimate humiliation tactic towards Tutsi men and women, with reports of sons being forced to rape their own mothers, as well as family members being forced to watch their loved ones’ rapes.¹⁸ While it is difficult to find specific orders towards militia members to rape, there is evidence to support the theory of rape as a genocidal military strategy in Rwanda. There have been discoveries made which state that there were inside jokes, as well as propaganda circulated during the conflict, which Hutu men interpreted as they were supposed to: to rape Tutsi women. ‘Kubohoza,’ a word meaning “to liberate,” was widely used during the genocide, which refers to rape, demonstrating a political acceptance and backing to the sexual misconduct.¹⁹

After extensively examining the concept of ‘genocidal rape’ and what this translates to in conflicts, in order to properly cover this concept, I feel it necessary to discuss the effects that mass rape and sexual misconduct have on their surviving victims. Rape can take women’s lives in a variety of ways. In these conflicts, many women die during their rape or shortly thereafter due to various reasons, such as dehydration, exposure; and many are beaten or shot after they are assaulted. What is also increasingly common is the feeling of wanting to die even after surviving rape; the victims often plead with the perpetrators to kill them. Many women actually commit suicide following these atrocities because of the physical and mental affects, and many women die trying to abort a pregnancy or give birth during the conflict.

Often, rape is considered to be a fate worse than death because the victim is left to attempt to live through their trauma, in societies where adequate health care and counselling is not available. Women who are survivors of rape are widely considered to be damaged and destroyed, so they are therefore not pushed to try and heal from their ordeals. Rape during genocide is so detrimental because it allows the perpetrators to achieve two goals at the same time; “the woman is effectively ‘killed,’ or loses the will to live, yet goes on living among her people as a constant reminder of their downfall.”²⁰

The immediate effects on survivors of genocidal rape are often a variety of sexually transmitted diseases including syphilis, HIV, and hepatitis. They are also more vulnerable to chronic health problems like asthma, diabetes, and arthritis.²¹ In Rwanda alone, it is estimated that over five hundred thousand women were raped, with anywhere from seventy to ninety percent of the survivors testing positive to HIV and AIDS. Meaning that one could argue that the Rwandan genocide is still claiming victims to this day. In addition to chronic health issues, sexual misconduct can result in numerous life-threatening injuries, especially internal bleeding.

These issues, if contracted during enslavement in genocide, are increasingly hard to treat after the conflict has ended, due to the amount of time that has passed.

Specifically, in Rwanda, women were “gutted” and sexually mutilated after their rapes,²² often having their breasts severed, making life after the genocide increasing difficult; as they are unable to have reconstructive surgery, hiding their rape scars is next to impossible, causing embarrassment and shame which follows them around for the rest of their lives. In terms of rape, pregnancy is naturally one of the most common side effects. If the woman is able to survive her pregnancy and childbirth, the child continues to be a reminder of the trauma that they suffered, providing a constant trigger to victims. The children themselves are often unaccepted in their communities because of the circumstances of their conception and the idea that they are a walking symbol of suffering for so many people. Women are often only accepted back into their communities following ethnic wars if they abort or murder their own child born from rape.²³

One of the most prevalent and long-term effects of rape is the psychological problems it causes for survivors. Post-traumatic stress disorder is one of the most common symptoms for survivors. They feel survivor’s guilt, as well as report having suicidal thoughts, self-harming behaviours, depression, anxiety and endless others.²⁴ Survivors often find it difficult to feel emotions or enjoy sexual intimacy, which can ultimately lead to a population decrease.

The acceptance of rape as a form of ethnic cleansing is a fairly new concept, thanks to recent international courts and tribunals. However, the occurrence of genocide through rape is a phenomenon that can be traced back to countless genocidal events, not just the two that I have explored here. Rape as a form of genocide is a far broader topic than many people realize, and is not just an ugly addition to ethnic wars, but in most cases is a strategic and intentional plan by military leaders to subject victims to the most humiliating and demeaning crimes a human being

can experience; forcing those involved to experience a fate worse than death, far more horrible than many people can even fathom.

Notes and References

- ¹ Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, "Rape as an Act of Genocide," *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 21, no. 2 (2003): 350, <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol21/iss2/5>.
- ² Jim Fussell, "The legal definition of genocide," Prevent Genocide International, accessed 3 March 2018, <http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext-printerfriendly.htm>.
- ³ Amit Ranjan, "Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971: Narratives, Impacts and the Actors," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 72, no. 2 (2016): 132-45, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928416637921>.
- ⁴ Ranjan, "Bangladesh Liberation War."
- ⁵ Ranjan, "Bangladesh Liberation War."
- ⁶ Ranjan, "Bangladesh Liberation War."
- ⁷ Rounaq Jahan, "Genocide in Bangladesh," in *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, 4th ed., eds. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 249-78.
- ⁸ Jahan, "Genocide in Bangladesh," 249-78.
- ⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, A/RES/260(III) (Paris, FR: United Nations General Assembly, 1948), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.html>.
- ¹⁰ Talukder, Rashid. *Refugees Flee toward India through a Subdistrict in East Pakistan's Comilla District (now Bangladesh)*, 1971, 1971, digital image, National Public Radio, <https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2010/09/29/130221326/test>.
- ¹¹ John Hagan, *Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 201.
- ¹² Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham, "Rape as a Weapon of Genocide," *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 3, no. 3 (2008), <https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol3/iss3/4>.
- ¹³ Reid-Cunningham, "Rape as a Weapon."
- ¹⁴ Cecilia D'Arville, "Violence Against Women in the Rwandan Genocide," *Perceptions: Undergraduate Journal of History and Social Sciences* 4, no. 1 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.15367/pj.v4i1.48>.
- ¹⁵ D'Arville, "Violence Against Women."
- ¹⁶ D'Arville, "Violence Against Women."
- ¹⁷ D'Arville, "Violence Against Women."
- ¹⁸ D'Arville, "Violence Against Women."
- ¹⁹ Reid-Cunningham, "Rape as a Weapon."
- ²⁰ Ann J. Cahill, *Rethinking Rape* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 13.
- ²¹ D'Arville, "Violence Against Women."
- ²² D'Arville, "Violence Against Women."
- ²³ Reid-Cunningham, "Rape as a Weapon."
- ²⁴ Reid-Cunningham, "Rape as a Weapon."

What is Genocide?

Khmer Rouge Regime

Cambodia

David Whittaker

By looking at the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1975-1979), this essay argues that the genocide was done through a process of extreme ‘othering’ against the educated and more urban Cambodians, which created a pseudo-race that the poorer and less educated Cambodians could victimize. This pseudo-race faced hatred that was akin to racism, and it was this ‘racism’ that caused many of the deaths during the Khmer Rouge regime. The Cambodian genocide left approximately 1.7 million people dead, which is equivalent to twenty-one percent of the population. Many Cambodians died from executions, famine, and exhaustion due to forced labor. The ‘othering’ was done through paranoia that pitted the less educated and more rural Cambodians against the educated and more urban Cambodians. People were afraid of enemies hiding in the cities, resulting in the creation of strict codes of conduct to manage the population. The punishment for almost all offenses was death. The ‘othering’ was so severe that a new class of people was made to be identified as the enemy, so people began to lie about their pasts and the poorest of Cambodia often became the leaders in certain areas. The ‘othered’ group of Cambodians would have the hardest work forced upon them, while still suffering the worst of the starvation, disease, and executions.

Genocide is a very powerful label, and it is extremely difficult to label something as genocide if it is not as horrific and on as large of a scale as the Nazi Holocaust. Genocide is also very hard to define as the group of people who are being killed may not be that different from their killers. Race is one of the most notable reasons for genocide, but cases of genocide exist where the victims were not selected for their race. The Cambodian genocide was not simply a matter of race, as many non-Cambodians were also targeted, but the largest death toll belongs to native Cambodians. The cause for the Cambodian genocide cannot be racism as the primary target was not a race; it was a perceived enemy that many people feared and hated with a ferocity

that was very much like racism. The hatred was so much like racism, and the ‘othering’ was so extreme, that it is fair to say that there was a pseudo-race created that faced an extreme racism. Despite the fact that it was not a particular race, or races, targeted, unlike the holocaust, the term ‘racism’ is a valid explanation to the violence inflicted upon the Cambodian population.

The concept of the new group of Cambodians being considered a new race is important, because the initial thought of them being the enemy, and the continual ‘othering’ of that group allowed them to be viewed as fundamentally different from the newly ruling Cambodians. The newly ruling Cambodians can be defined as the Khmer Rouge regime and the former impoverished and uneducated Cambodians who became the new community leaders. The educated and wealthy Cambodians were the ‘othered’ group, that would either lie about their past or be subject to mass executions. The more educated and skilled Cambodians were left in a state of confusion as they suddenly belonged to the lowest class of people in Cambodia. This is not to say that the ‘othered’ group were the only ones to suffer, as the majority of Cambodia faced famine and most had to participate in forced labor; but they were treated the worst and were often the ones who died.

The lowest death toll that I have found is in the book *Kampuchea Decade of the Genocide*, where the number is estimated to be around one million.¹ This value is substantially lower than the previously stated count of 1.7 million, which is more valid as it is most often used today, while the one million is a very modest estimation and is still a sizable number of deaths. The same book states that when “examining the whole of the decade of the 1970s shows that the total loss in Kampuchea’s population including refugees amounted to nearly two million people. This means a loss of almost thirty percent of the entire population.”² The earlier estimation of

one million people dead during the genocide was very low in comparison to the more modern estimations, so it could be speculated that the total loss of population may be greater than thirty percent.

When the Khmer Rouge regime came into power in 1975, they declared a reset to Cambodia. This is known as the Year Zero. The past was forgotten, or at least that was the intent, and the country declared the official calendar year to be zero. The country was also renamed to the Democratic Kampuchea, or simply Kampuchea. With this came the relocation of the population, forced labor, and the ‘othering’ of various Cambodian populations. First was the relocation to the countryside, where many educated, industrial, middle class Cambodians were forced to move to the rural areas of Cambodia, so that they could produce food and “assimilate” with the pre-existing rural population. One of the explanations to why the relocations needed to occur was because of enemies who lived in the cities, some being CIA, who wanted to undermine the revolution and destroy Kampuchea. “Even representatives of the Democratic Kampuchea government admitted afterwards that the evacuation of Phnom Penh with its population of 3 million demanded some 2,000-3,000 deaths.”³ These deaths, unfortunately, were just the beginning.

To fully understand the large amount of paranoia that the people of Cambodia had, the internal and external pressures that they faced must be examined. Internally, a revolution had just overthrown the former system of government and the Khmer Rouge regime began. The Khmer Rouge regime was full of untrusting people who often used the excuse of potential traitors or current enemies so that they could commit atrocities. This resulted in a large portion of the population being viewed as a potential enemy. Externally, the Cambodians had to suffer through the US-Vietnam war which had just finished, as well as the massive bombing raids conducted by

the US, which left many Cambodian regions devastated. Fearing outside invasion, mainly from the Vietnamese, and continued devastation from other foreigners, the Cambodians feared that there may be foreign agents among them who posed as the former middle-to-upper class. This was intensified when the Khmer Rouge regime used the notion of possible CIA agents as an excuse to evacuate cities.

In the rural areas that people were forced to move in to, there was already a population of people who had always lived there. This created an ‘us versus them’ mentality that grew larger as time progressed, mainly due to the actions of the Khmer Rouge. The new members of the rural society were suspected by the original population of being traitors or enemies, especially since the cause of the relocation was to stop enemies of the state. This relocation also left empty cities, and unprepared Cambodians faced famine as they did not have the experience or tools required to work the land for food. They also had very little food to begin with. This was the start of a widespread famine that lasted from 1975-1977.

“Villagers say that the elderly and children were least able to survive lack of food, but even young adults died.”⁴ Food, water, and medicine were in short supply for those who were evacuated from the cities, which led to the first wave of death from starvation. This would continue as the country was unable to supply enough food for everyone due to insufficient leadership. In response to this, the ownership of land was transferred to the state, and people were forced to do labor to produce food. In an effort to destroy social classes, the former upper class were forced to “[perform] the hardest physical labour in the manner of the poorest of the peasants.”⁵ The aim was not the elimination of the members of the middle and upper classes, but the result was a large number of deaths due to the overworking of the malnourished group. Since they were already treated with suspicion, the logical conclusion of some

Cambodians would be that it was justice, because the ‘othered’ group deserved to suffer.

This would only separate the two groups more. This separation worsened the treatment that the ‘others’ received and continued to dehumanize them.

One of the most destructive forces to the Cambodians was the war with Vietnam. At first, it was not because the Vietnamese were extremely destructive, but because the Cambodian response to these attacks was often self-destructive. When a Cambodian force was defeated, it was because they were not true Cambodians, so “tens of thousands of them were rounded up to be evacuated toward the northwest, but the evacuation degenerated into a massacre in many places.”⁶ In other areas, the troops sent to evacuate the border troops ended up getting into full combat, which devastated the Cambodian armies. In 1977, the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, became more paranoid, and mass executions grew, thus the event dubbed “the Killing Fields” began. These were large scale executions of both soldiers and civilians in fields, committed by the Cambodian army. Civilians were often told that they were to be taken to go do work and would never return. These executions continued until 1979, when the Khmer Rouge regime ended, and the Vietnamese occupation began. Though the occupation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese was not ideal, it did end the large-scale genocide that the Khmer Rouge was committing and instigating.



“Pol Pot, 1980.”⁷

The Khmer Rouge would also begin to imprison large amounts of people who were suspected of any crime. The punishment of almost all crimes was death, and the prisoners would often be eventually executed. The policy of torture was implemented on the majority of prisoners and would last for a prolonged period of time. Prisoners who had glasses would have them taken away and destroyed, as did many Cambodians, as they were viewed as a symbol of education and, by extension, hostility to the new Cambodian regime.

Year Zero, the new Cambodia, and the new Khmer Rouge regime ‘othered’ a large amount of people, to such an extent that they created a pseudo-race that people treated with hatred on a similar scale to which the German Nazis treated Jewish people and other minorities. The targets of the Khmer Rouge were fellow Cambodians but, more specifically, they were the wealthy or middle-class citizens. The professional workers, the educated, the former members of the Cambodian government pre-1975, and the urban population were also targeted. Minorities were of course targeted, as many genocidal governments do, but followers of various religious

groups who were native Cambodians were also persecuted. These very large populations of Cambodians were ‘othered’ in a way that completely separated them from the newly leading Cambodians, who were the poor who dedicated themselves to the Khmer Rouge, as well as the Khmer Rouge themselves. Due to the conditions of Cambodia, the lack of food and water especially, and the paranoia-fueled executions, the ‘othered’ groups were subject to genocide in the hopes of totally killing their groups. What was framed as an attempt to assimilate the middle to upper classes with the lower class was truly the destruction of those classes through the death of their members.



“Cambodian refugees wait in long lines for food rations of eggs and rice inside a camp on the Thailand/Cambodia border in 1979. Photos by Jay Mather.”⁸

The leading groups of Cambodians, meaning the safest, were the loyal soldiers of the Khmer Rouge. “Even before victory, Cambodians thirteen and fourteen years old were often taken from their homes in liberated areas and subjected to short indoctrination courses from which they emerged, according to a U.S. embassy study in early 1975, ‘fierce in their

condemnation of the “old ways”, contemptuous of traditional customs, and ardently opposed to religion and parental authority.”⁹ The child soldiers were taught to see certain Cambodians as enemies. This was prevalent when they evacuated the cities, as all of the armed forces, including the children, would maneuver as if they were in hostile territory, and when the Cambodians welcomed them to the cities, the soldiers did not reciprocate the friendly attitudes. The soldiers and the original rural population all treated the ‘other’ Cambodians with disdain, which ultimately led to the violence towards the ‘othered’ Cambodians.

“Under [Democratic Kampuchea], familyism, individualism, private property, personality, and vanity, and feudal religious practices were all renounced. In their place, people’s biographies were sought, not to uncover skills useful to DK but to determine class origins and affiliations, seen as keys to attitudes and behavior.”¹⁰ Social class was not seen as an economic standing, rather, it was an ideology and people were made to suffer for that perceived ideology. Religious people, primarily Buddhists, were portrayed as anti-Cambodia because the people were told to renounce their religion so that they can serve Cambodia, or the Democratic Kampuchea, without any contradicting ideologies. One would have to completely renounce everything for the service of Kampuchea, otherwise they would often die.

The main targets of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia were Cambodians who were not members of the ideal class. ‘Othering’ was used to separate the population of Cambodia into two groups, so that there could be conflict between them, and hatred could be simplified. The Khmer Rouge could control one group, often the less educated, so that they could commit acts of genocide. Of the 1.7 million Cambodians who died, the ‘others’ made up a large majority, but they were not the only ones made to suffer. Starvation and disease were classless, and almost everyone suffered in many ways. Almost all who faced executions were part of the new pseudo-

race, mainly because when one was chosen for execution, it was due to some trait that assimilated that person into the new race of Cambodians. Today, there is an ongoing tribunal in Cambodia that hopes to find justice for Cambodia; luckily, it is not too late to punish many of those who participated in the genocide. This essay does not claim that everyone who died during the Khmer Rouge regime was a direct result of 'othering,' but it does argue that many people who did die were subject to extreme 'othering' that bred hatred akin to racism. Without the extreme 'othering,' there would not have been a group to be subject to that level of hatred. It is because of this 'othering' that so many Cambodians died, and that the Khmer Rouge regime lasted as long as it did.

Notes and References

- ¹ Kimmo Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide* (Bath, UK: The Bath Press, 1986), 33.
- ² Kiljunen, *Kampuchea*, 33.
- ³ Kiljunen, 33.
- ⁴ Ben Kiernan, ed., *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 54.
- ⁵ Kiljunen, *Kampuchea*, 17.
- ⁶ David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 271.
- ⁷ *Pol Pot*, 1980, digital image, Bettmann Archive, <https://cdn.britannica.com/s:1500x700.q:85/68/19068-004-3059FB3B/Pol-Pot-1980.jpg>.
- ⁸ Jay Mather, *Cambodian refugees wait in long lines for food rations of eggs and rice inside a camp on the Thailand/Cambodia border in 1979*, 2010, digital image, Coloradan Alumni Magazine, <https://www.colorado.edu/coloradan/2010/06/01/cambodia-photojournalist-returns-forgotten-country>.
- ⁹ Chandler, *Cambodian History*, 243.
- ¹⁰ Chandler, *Cambodian History*, 243.

Women in Genocide

Claire McCloskey

Within the societies in which we live today, it is not usual for women to be involved in the military or police force. It is also not unheard of for women to participate in crimes which can sometimes be quite violent. With this in mind, why is it that it is considered “shocking” for women to have been involved in the perpetration of genocide? More often than not, women are viewed as the main victims of violence, particularly sexual violence, that is committed during genocide, whereas men are more likely to be the perpetrators of these acts of violence and killing. While this view would not be wrong, and is often the case, the participation of women as perpetrators of crimes against humanity should not be overlooked or discounted. Women can and have been directly involved in genocidal violence against men and women alike.¹ Perhaps it is because of society's belief that women are inherently innocent beings that there is a certain unwillingness to consider women in such a violent way. However, with a little research, one can access accounts of women attacking and pillaging convoys of refugees during the Armenian Genocide, women involved in ‘euthanasia’ killings in Nazi concentration camps, or Rwandan females ordering the torture, rape, and killing of Tutsi men and women during the Rwandan Genocide.²

“A morally inexcusable action may fall anywhere on a continuum from culpable ignorance or weakness to deliberately and knowingly doing evil for its own sake.” This paper seeks to explore the latter of this quotation by John Kekes, from his book *The Roots of Evil*, however, the focus will not simply be on perpetrators in general, but the female perpetrators of genocide.³ When studying genocide, females are often regarded as victims and portrayed as having little-to-no compliance in the events that have taken place. While it is true that much of the “work” has been carried out by men, it would be naïve to discount the roles that women have played, whether it be the creation and maintenance of an oppressive society or the physical act of

killing. Typically, when women are referenced in regard to genocide, it is in reference to the immense amount of violence inflicted upon them, rather than violent acts committed by them. Sexual violence against women is at the forefront of almost every discussion about genocide, so much so that women are often left out or forgotten when discussing who could commit such crimes. The idea of women as perpetrators of genocide seems to be missing from the conversation entirely. By examining the Rwandan genocide with examples taken from the events of the Holocaust, women's roles can be better understood: their roles in inciting genocide, how they differed from men, and the motivations behind their participation in these crimes against humanity.

It is mainly the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda that is accredited with drawing attention to the participation of women in this genocide: particularly high-profile women, in not only their violent acts but also bureaucratic actions that may have helped instigate or promote the events of 1994.⁴ To understand the events of the Rwandan genocide and female participation in them, one must examine the status of women in pre-genocide Rwandan society. Prior to these atrocious events, Rwandan females lived under a very patriarchal society, with many popular dictums, such as “a woman's only wealth is a man,” and “in a home where a woman speaks there is discord.”⁵ As in many patriarchal societies, women were the primary caregivers for their families, responsible for maintaining the household, expected to remain submissive to their husband, and were expected to have had some experience with sexual violence, even before its usage during the genocide. Women, at the time, were also vastly underrepresented in the political sphere of Rwandan society, however that is not to say that women were absent from the political sphere; in fact, of the females accused of committing or instigating genocide, three of them were women who had held key political positions at the

time. Not only were several of the accused involved in political life, but also among the accused were nuns of the Savu Monastery in Bature, who were ultimately tried and convicted for their crimes in Belgium.⁶

The women of the Third Reich also played a role in the destruction caused by the Nazi party during the Second World War. While often not as direct in the acts of genocide as the women in Rwanda, the women of Germany played a significant role in maintaining the ideals of the Nazi party as well as maintaining morale throughout society. Women were incredibly important to the fundamental ideal of Nazism, which was that of pure race. The Third Reich had in place a population policy in which “racially pure women were to bear as many Aryan children as possible.”⁷ As stated previously, women were not often used as direct perpetrators of the genocide. However, they were encouraged by the National Socialist Women’s Union and German Women’s Agency to focus on the household and their families, in order to ensure that their husbands and loved ones could focus solely on their work.⁸ However, not all women were content with supporting these actions from the ground up, and became members of the Schutzstaffel (SS), a paramilitary Nazi organization, or began working as guards in Nazi-controlled concentration camps. Of these women were Hilde Lisiewitz and Herta Ehlert, both notorious guards at their respective concentration camps. Hilde Lisiewitz, as described in the deposition of Dora Almalden at the Belsen Trial against SS agents and former camp guards, was a female guard at the camp. In Exhibit 16, Almalden describes an instance in which she allowed two men to each take a turnip from her cart of vegetables. Seeing this, Lisiewitz pushed the men to the ground and beat them on the head repeatedly with a stick that she allegedly carried with her at all times, she then stomped on their chests above their hearts. Similarly, in the affidavit of Hilda Loffler, guard Herta Elbert was accused of being responsible for many deaths in the

camps. These two women were ultimately arrested and tried for their crimes at the end of the war.⁹

Traditionally, women's primary roles in genocide have been behind the scenes, as demonstrated during the Holocaust. Although it was not unheard of for women to be a direct cause of pain and destruction, the roles of women did not stray far from their traditional female roles in the home. They were the caregivers, the guardians of the movement, whereas the men were responsible for the actual implementation of violence. This began to change, and the Rwandan genocide saw more women involved than ever before. This may have been a direct cause of the propaganda issued by high-ranking Hutus throughout the country. While some of their documents and rhetoric was specific to women, they were not the only targets of anti-Tutsi propaganda. This genocide was different than those before it, as propaganda was not gender specific. When Hutu leaders, such as Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, called for the annihilation of Tutsis from Rwandan society, they were referring to men, women, and even children. While it could be said that similarly, Hitler called for the complete destruction of the Jewish people, it is quite rare to come across women negatively depicted in their propaganda, as women and children alike are generally viewed as being defenseless and weak. Nazi propaganda was almost always male-specific, which led to gender-selective executions that were seen at the beginning of the war on the eastern front.¹⁰

By examining both the Rwandan Genocide as well as the Holocaust, it can be determined that different types of propaganda are used in an effort to incite participation. As previously mentioned, during the Holocaust, women were plied with the idea of creating a pure and ideal race. They were to create and maintain perfect families that fit the perception of 'Aryan.' This was their duty as women of the Third Reich, to support their leader and his vision for the

world. Often, this was done through written propaganda, official in nature, such as the population policy in Germany, or the Hutu 10 Commandments, published four years before in 1990. The first commandment lists stated that anyone involved with a Tutsi would be considered a traitor. What is interesting about this commandment in particular is that it was specific in stating that it was referring to being involved with a Tutsi female. Commandment three of the document also stated: “Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.”¹¹ Rwandan propaganda tended to go even further; having cartoons drawn, depicting Tutsi women as seducers and whores. What can be taken from this is the significance placed upon kinship, the ideas of family, and being loyal to one’s family. Propaganda towards men typically portrays them as being strong victors, calling on them to protect their country, take up arms against the enemy and be men. However, what was being pedaled to these women were notions of saving their families from falling apart and keeping their men in line, being guardians of the mother and doing the “right” thing. This type of propaganda is used in an attempt to relate to a mother’s or female’s instinct to protect their family unit by presenting the nationality (or whatever is deemed to be at stake) with that sense of family behind it. By portraying the enemy as someone who is trying to harm or sabotage this sense, women were more encouraged and prepared to fight for their beliefs.¹²

If the women in pre-genocidal Rwanda were considered submissive, docile beings, incapable of inflicting violence upon others, the testimonies of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have shattered this illusion. Mentioned above, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was the Minister of Family Affairs and Women’s Development at the time the genocide began. Tried and convicted, Nyiramasuhuko received a life sentence for crimes against humanity, rape as a crime against humanity, and violence to life as a war crime.¹³ Nyiramasuhuko was ultimately

responsible for beginning and overseeing the genocide killings of Tutsis in her home province of Bature, thus ending the notion that women involved in the Rwandan genocide did not have a hand in the violence.¹⁴ It was not only women of politics that participated in the act of killing, as journalists, housewives, and even nuns had a role in the massacre.

A fact that is still puzzling to many is what motivated these women to commit such atrocities. How could women commit such violent acts? It has been widely suggested that these women were not acting of their own free will, that they were both wives and mothers, unable to do such things as a result of this fact. It has also been suggested that because the majority of women are to be considered innocent beings, those who committed these war crimes should be considered monsters or deviants, separate from the notion of a true woman.¹⁵ By doing this, women are placed outside, excluded from what it is to be a 'natural woman,' and therefore allowing their motives to be overlooked or tossed aside, arguably excusing their actions. Another defense often used by Rwandan women accused of crimes against humanity is that of fear. This notion is often directly correlated with the Rwandan ideal that women were meant to be of the home, to be submissive to men within the society. Women reported being forced to commit violent acts or to turn over the locations of any known Tutsis. In several interviews conducted by Nicole Hogg with female Rwandan criminals, women stated that it was because of a lack of male presence in their households that they feared to disobey the militia.¹⁶

The greatest argument for the motivation of these women is that they simply had no power in what was taking place. Hogg recounts several interviews with the defense counsel for Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, in which it is stated that although she was Minister within the government, she "had no power in the genocidal government," she did not hold any influential portfolios, and maintains that she was merely appointed to this position because she had a

friendly relationship with the Presidents family.¹⁷ According to Hogg, this defense of powerlessness as motivation has been popular amongst the women who have been tried in front of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

This defense, however, is nothing but an attempt to disassociate with the idea of women being capable of committing heinous war crimes. By implying that women are simply fearful and powerless, it takes away a certain level of responsibility and choice; thus making it more difficult for those seeking justice for the victims of these women to find it. For all the women who participated in these crimes, there are even more who did not succumb to the propaganda, the fear, the apparent powerlessness; making the conscious choice to remain separate from the violence.¹⁸

Regardless of the motivation behind their actions, it is important to recognize women as perpetrators in an act that has, up until recently, been regarded as something inherently male. While it is true that, historically, genocides have been initiated by men in dominant roles, it must be understood that women do have a role in the actions of a genocide, be it supporting as a housewife or inciting participation, to the act of killing. This takes the focus of the study of genocide away from being male-specific, and reinterprets it as a genderless issue, which could be committed by either men or women. To delve deeper into each genocide would present different examples of women as perpetrators. However, a focus on the Rwandan genocide, with examples from the Holocaust, is important, as the Holocaust is known worldwide and is a primary example of genocide, whereas Rwanda requires more focus in this case, as it is more recent and had seen a greater number of women as participants than ever before. By understanding the roles and motivations of women as perpetrators of genocide, there is hope that the international community will better understand it in its entirety, and will one day lead to its prevention.

Notes and References

- ¹ Geentanjali Gangoli, "Engendering Genocide: Gender, Conflict and Violence," *Women's Studies International Forum* 29, no. 5 (2006): 536, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2006.07.010>.
- ² Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (London, UK: Routledge, 2006), 333.
- ³ John Kekes, *The Roots of Evil* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2.
- ⁴ Nicole Hogg, "Women's Participation in the Rwandan Genocide: Mothers or Monsters?," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 877 (2010): 70, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383110000019>.
- ⁵ Hogg, "Mothers or Monsters?," 71.
- ⁶ Donna Maier, "Women Leaders in the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Choose to Kill," *Universitas* 8 (2012): 5, <https://universitas.uni.edu/volume-8-2012-2013/essays-studies-and-works/women-leaders-rwandan-genocide-when-women-choose-kill>.
- ⁷ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Women in the Third Reich," Holocaust Encyclopedia, accessed 14 November 2013, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/women-in-the-third-reich>.
- ⁸ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Women in the Third Reich."
- ⁹ Colin R. Leech, "Transcript of the Official Shorthand Notes of 'The Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty-Four Others'," accessed 11 November 2013, http://www.bergenbelsen.co.uk/pages/trialtranscript/trial_contents.html.
- ¹⁰ Jones, *Genocide*, 334.
- ¹¹ Maier, "Women Leaders," 6.
- ¹² Jones, *Genocide*, 335.
- ¹³ The Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., ICTR-98-42-T (2011), Judgement and Sentence, <https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ict98-42-trial-judgements/en/110624.pdf>.
- ¹⁴ Maier, "Women Leaders," 8.
- ¹⁵ Maier, 13.
- ¹⁶ Hogg, "Women's Participation," 84.
- ¹⁷ Hogg, 93.
- ¹⁸ Maier, "Women Leaders," 14.

Index

Adolf Hitler
 final Solution, 47, 51, 54
 in Nazi Germany, 37, 46, 51, 53
Albert Speer, 38
Anti-Semitism/Racial Purity in Nazi Germany, 46, 48, 51, 52, 54
Armenian Genocide, 91
Aryans, 48, 53, 93, 94
Bangladesh Genocide, 69, 72, 73
Bangladesh Liberation Wars, 68, 69
Belgian peacekeepers, 25
Bill Clinton
 and entry into office, 23
 administration, 24, 27
Bornstein and Milton
Action Against the Enemy's Mind, 49
Cambodian Genocide
 as label of 'genocide,' 80
 causes/racism - 80
 forced Labour, 80-82
 introduction/Statistics, 80-81
 widespread famine, 81, 83
Children of Rape in Rwandan Genocide, 15, 17
Christine Shelly, 27
Cold War
 and the collapse of the USSR, 22
Defendant Rights, 36
Ervin Staub and Bystanders, 50, 51
The Eternal Jew, 48, 49, 54
Eugenie Kayierere, 9
Female-led Households after Rwandan Genocide, 10
Forces Armées Rwandaises, 58
Fritz Saukel, 38
The Gacaca courts, 10, 11, 73
Genocide Convention of 1948, 21, 27
Genocidal rape – 68, 72
 and HIV/AIDS, 75, 81
 as crime against humanity, 76, 95
 definition, 72
 sexual Mutilation, 70, 74
 trauma, 72, 75, 76
George Bush
 and new world order, 22
Hutus, 9, 25, 29, 57, 58, 94
In Absentia, 36, 37
Inter-Allied Resolution on German War Crimes, 71

Joseph Goebbels, 46, 53
 Juvenal Habyarimana, 25, 57, 58
 Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1975-1979), 79-88
 'Kubohoza', 74
 Infanticide, 15
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 10
 International Criminal Tribunals
 legal process, 34
 Yugoslavia Proceedings, 34, 35, 38, 41, 71
 Intervention failures in Somalia, 23, 24
 Kigali, 25, 26, 58, 62, 65
 Michael Lipson, 28
 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 69
 Nazi Doctrine, 48
 Nazi Propoganda Machine, 46-50, 54
 Nine Months to Freedom, 69
 Nuremberg Trials, 34, 37, 38
 Odette Mukamusoni, 13
 Partition of India – 68, 69
 Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 16, 94-96
 Peacekeeping in Rwanda, 21
 Pol Pot, 84, 85
 Race and Religion in Nazi Germany, 53
 Rape in Rwandan Genocide, 9-17, 59-60, 73, 74, 76
 Ratko Mladic, 35, 40
 Resistance Sector, 51, 52
 Romeo Dallaire, 17, 24, 25, 26
 Rome Statute, 36
 Rwandan Association of Genocide Widows, 63
 Rwandan Genocide
 aftermath, 29, 57, 62
 as 'forgotten genocide,' 73
 end of genocide, 27-29
 global/UN/US reaction and efforts, 21, 23, 26
 introduction/statistics, 9, 57, 72
 opposition to term 'genocide,' 26
 stories of sexual violence, 58, 59
 survivor emotions/testimonies, 58, 59, 61
 violence against boys and men, 61, 62
 Saadia Touval, 23
 Sexual Violence and HIV/AIDS, 9, 13, 14, 57, 60, 63, 65, 68, 75
 Sexual Violence and mental health, 9, 12, 17
 Slobodan Milosevic, 35, 41
 Soviet Union
 and the collapse of the USSR, 22
 and the United States, 22, 23

- invasion of Soviet Union, 46
- Survivors Fund, 63
- The Roots of Evil*, 91
- Trial Chamber, 36
- Tutsis, 9, 16, 25, 29, 57, 94, 96
- Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front, 24, 29
- United Nations
 - assistance Mission for Rwanda, 24-26, 28, 29
 - introduction, 21
 - failures, 39
 - finding Justice, 34, 40
 - International Tribunals, 35, 37
 - peacekeeping workforce statistics, 39
 - security council, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29
 - UN Charter, 40
 - 1988-1995 peacekeeping missions, 22
- The United States and Peacekeeping, 21-23
- Women in Genocide
 - as willful acts of atrocity/motivation, 97
 - as perpetrators, 15-17, 91-93, 97
 - Herta Ehlert, 93
 - Hilde Lisiewitz, 93
 - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and female participation, 92, 95, 97
 - in the Holocaust/behind the scenes, 97
- in Rwandan Genocide, 94
- Minister of Family Affairs and Women's Development, 16, 95
- Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 16, 94-96
- prevention, 97
 - women of the Third Reich, 93, 94
- World War Two, 34, 37
- Nazi Germany, 37, 46, 51, 53
- Year Zero and 'otherness,' 80-88
- 1948 Genocide Convention – 27

Glossary

Absentia: The defendant has their rights waived to be physically at the trial.

Auschwitz: A concentration camp in Poland run by German Nazi's during the Holocaust.

Bangladesh Genocide: The planned systematic and supported use of torture and rape during the violence.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity: Presented certain guidelines as to what is considered a crime against humanity, the ability to judge and to bring people to justice.

Genocide: The intentional mass killing of many people from a certain race, nation, or ethnic group with hopes to wipe out the entirety of said group.

Genocidal Rape: Rape on a mass scale with the goal being to ethnically cleanse and eliminate a population in an atrocious way.

HIV/AIDS: A disease that is contracted through blood, sexual action, or shared items such as needles, that affect the immune system and cause death.

Holocaust: The genocide of Jewish peoples.

Kubohaza: Meaning "to liberate." Used during the genocide, referencing rape, demonstrating a political acceptance, and backing to the sexual misconduct.

Massacre: The violent slaughtering of many people

Looting: Property or stolen items taken during wars or riots

National Socialist Women's Union and German Women's Agency: Encouraged women to focus on the household and family so their husbands could focus primarily on their work within the genocide.

Nazi Propaganda Machine: How the Nazi government was able to carry out things such as mass execution with little consequences or rebellion from the people

Peacekeeper: A peacekeepers job is to reduce violence, protect people in society, prevent conflict, and create more security.

Propaganda: Information spread that is bias to create a particular view of an issue or idea.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): A mental illness that is triggered by a particular event from violence, danger, or something shocking. Effects of this could include flashbacks, nightmares, panic attacks, irritability, aggression, and more.

Rape: Sexual intercourse or any type of sexual activity that is forced, unwanted, or done without consent.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A treaty established within the court system.

Rwandan Genocide: A genocide that took place between April and July of 1994 killing around 800,000 Tutsi people who were murdered by Hutu militias.

Sexual Violence: The act of violence through sexual action that can cause emotional, mental, and physical damage to one's body.

The Gacaca Courts: The community court in Rwanda.

The International Criminal for Rwanda (ICTR): A three-tiered system that institutes international law to seek punishment, justice, and prevention of crimes.

The Nuremberg Trials: Created after World War II to punish the Nazi's for the crimes that they committed and to show people that justice was being served.

Trial Chamber: Ensured that the trial was quick and followed all rights to the defendants.

United Nations: An organization created whose goal is to keep peace, friendship, and security throughout the nations.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR): A mission deployed in 1993 that fought to end the four-year civil war between the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front and the primarily Hutu Rwanda government.

1948 Genocide Convention: Creating a treaty between nations to prevent and punish genocide and to penalize all people guilty of genocide.

Bibliography

- Bangladesh Genocide Archive. "Genocide." Accessed 28 February 2018.
<http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/>.
- Barnett, Michael N. "The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda." *Cultural Anthropology* 12, no. 4 (2008): 551-78.
<https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1997.12.4.551>.
- Berkeley, Bill. "Road to a Genocide." In *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, 103-166. Edited by Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002.
- Boissoneault, Lorraine. "The Genocide the U.S. Can't Remember, But Bangladesh Can't Forget." *Smithsonian Magazine*, 16 December 2016.
<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/genocide-us-cant-remember-bangladesh-cant-forget-180961490/>
- Borger, Julian. "Ratko Mladic: the full story of how the general evaded capture for so long." *The Guardian*, 2 April 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/02/ratko-mladic-life-run>.
- Bornstein, Joseph and Paul R. Milton. *Action Against the Enemy's Mind*. New York, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Publishers, 1942.
- Boycotting Activity in Neustadt am Aisch, MIDN 207. Yad Vashem Archives, Shoah Resource Centre: The International School for Holocaust Studies.
https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203269.pdf.
- Brounéus, Karen. "The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 3 (2010): 408-37. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709360322>.
- Bytwerk, Randall. "Der Reichsführer SS/SS-Hauptamt, *Rassenpolitik*." 1943. German Propaganda Archive, Berlin, Germany.
<http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/rassenpo.htm>.
- Bytwerk, Randall. "The Argument for Genocide in Nazi Propaganda." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 91, no. 1 (2005): 37-62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00335630500157516>.
- Cahill, Ann J. *Rethinking Rape*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- Chandler, David P. *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991.

Clark, Joe. "Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, on Canada and Indochina." House of Commons, Ottawa, ON, 25 January 1990. https://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.sas_19900125ESt.

Dallaire, Roméo and Brent Beardsley. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. Toronto, ON: Random House Canada, 2003.

D'Arville, Cecilia. "Violence Against Women in the Rwandan Genocide." *Perceptions: Undergraduate Journal of History and Social Sciences* 4, no. 1 (2017): 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.15367/pj.v4i1.48>.

The Digital Archive of Cambodian Holocaust Survivors. "Sisowath Doung Chanto." Accessed 14 October 2014. <http://www.cybercambodia.com/dachs/about.html>.

Documentation Center of Cambodia. *Minute of the Standing Committee: The Front*. Translated by Bunsou Sour. Edited by David P. Chandler. D7562. Phnom Penh, KH: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 1976. http://d.dccam.org/Archives/Documents/DK_Policy/DK_Policy_Standing_Committee_Minutes.htm.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Albert Speer." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/559185/Albert-Speer>.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Fritz Sauckel." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/525321/Fritz-Sauckel>.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Nürnberg trials." Accessed 11 November 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/422668/Nurnberg-trials>.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Ratko Mladic." Accessed 12 November 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1112680/Ratko-Mladic>.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Slobodan Milosevic." Accessed 12 November 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/383076/Slobodan-Milosevic>.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Srebrenica massacre." Accessed 12 November 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1697253/Srebrenica-massacre>.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "War crime." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/635621/war-crime/224687/The-Nurnberg-and-Tokyo-trials>.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Wanted by the FBI." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.fbi.gov/wanted>.

- Feil, Scott R. *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda*. New York, NY: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998.
<https://www.carnegie.org/publications/preventing-genocide-how-the-early-use-of-force-might-have-succeeded-in-rwanda/>.
- Fussell, Jim. "The legal definition of genocide." Prevent Genocide International. Accessed 3 March 2018. <http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext-printerfriendly.htm>.
- Gangoli, Geentanjali. "Engendering Genocide: Gender, Conflict and Violence." *Women's Studies International Forum* 29, no. 5 (2006): 534-8.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2006.07.010>.
- Genocide Watch. "Bangladesh." Accessed 28 February 2018.
<http://www.genocidewatch.org/bangladesh.html>.
- Gladstone, William. "Thoughts on the business of life." *Forbes*. Accessed 13 November 2013.
<http://thoughts.forbes.com/thoughts/justice-william-e-gladstone-justice-delayed-is>.
- Glick, Peter and Elizabeth Levy Paluck. "The Aftermath of Genocide: History as a Proximal Cause." *Journal of Social Issues* 69, no. 1 (2013): 200-8.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12011>.
- Hagan, John. *Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Hatzfeld, Jean. *The Antelope's Strategy: Living in Rwanda after the Genocide*. New York, NY: Picador Press, 2009.
- Hatzfeld, Jean. *Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak*. New York, NY: Other Press, 2006.
- Hatzfeld, Jean. *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak*. New York, NY: Picador Press, 2005.
- Hayes, Peter. *The People and the Mob: The Ideology of Civil Conflict in Modern Europe*. Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 1992.
- Herf, Jeffrey. *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Herf, Jeffrey. "The 'Jewish War': Goebbels and the Antisemitic Campaigns of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry." *Holocaust Genocide Studies* 19, no. 1 (2005): 51-80.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/dci003>.
- Hippler, Fritz, dir. *Der ewige Jude*. 1940; Germany: Terra Film, 1940.

- Hirsch, Marianne. "Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Work of Postmemory." *The Yale Journal of Criticism* 14, no. 1 (2001): 5-37. <https://doi.org/10.1353/yale.2001.0008>.
- Hitler Supporters Parade in Rain, 200 UN 5-128-2. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, United States of America. <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn1000330>.
- Hogg, Nicole. "Women's Participation in the Rwandan Genocide: Mothers or Monsters?" *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 877 (2010): 69-102. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383110000019>.
- Holt, Victoria K. and Michael G. MacKinnon. "The Origins and Evolution of US Policy Towards Peace Operations." *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 1 (2008): 18-24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310701879860>.
- Human Rights Watch. *Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda's Community-Based Gacaca Courts*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2011. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandas-community-based-gacaca-courts>.
- Ignatieff, Michael. "Intervention and State Failure." In *The Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, 229-44. Edited by Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002.
- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.icty.org/>.
- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. "About the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY>.
- INTERPOL. "Wanted Persons." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.interpol.int/Wanted-Persons>.
- Jahan, Rounaq. "Genocide in Bangladesh." In *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, 4th ed., edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 249-78. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.
- Jones, Adam. *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*. London, UK: Routledge, 2006.
- Jones, Adam. *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*. Oxfordshire, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2016.
- Kaplan, Suzanne. "Child Survivors of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and Trauma-Related Affect." *Journal of Social Issues* 69, no. 1 (2013): 92-110. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12005>.

- Kekes, John. *The Roots of Evil*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Kiernan, Ben, ed. *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Kiernan, Ben. *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.
- Kiljunen, Kimmo. *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*. Bath, UK: The Bath Press, 1986.
- Koomen, Jonneke. “‘Without These Women, the Tribunal Cannot Do Anything’: The Politics of Witness Testimony on Sexual Violence at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.” *Signs* 38, no. 2 (2013): 253-77. <https://doi.org/10.1086/667200>.
- Leech, Colin R. “Transcript of the Official Shorthand Notes of ‘The Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty-Four Others.’” Accessed 11 November 2013. http://www.bergenbelsen.co.uk/pages/trialtranscript/trial_contents.html.
- Lehmann, Otto and Eberhard Moeller. *Jud Seuss*. Directed by Veit Harlan. 1940; Frankfurt, GR: Terra Film, 1940.
- Lipson, Michael. “A ‘Garbage Can Model’ of UN Peacekeeping.” *Global Governance* 13, no. 1 (2007): 79-97. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800643>.
- Lipson, Michael. “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 5 (2007): 5-34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107074283>.
- Maier, Donna. “Women Leaders in the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Choose to Kill.” *Universitas* 8 (2012): 1-20. <https://universitas.uni.edu/volume-8-2012-2013/essays-studies-and-works/women-leaders-rwandan-genocide-when-women-choose-kill>.
- Mandelbaum-Schmid, Judith. “Rwandan genocide survivors in need of HIV treatment.” *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 82, no. 6 (2004): 472. <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15356944/>.
- Mather, Jay. *Cambodian refugees wait in long lines for food rations of eggs and rice inside a camp on the Thailand/Cambodia border in 1979*. 2010. Digital image. Coloradan Alumni Magazine, Boulder, CO. <https://www.colorado.edu/coloradan/2010/06/01/cambodia-photojournalist-returns-forgotten-country>.
- McLure, Jason. “New Hampshire Woman to be Tried Again in Rwandan Genocide.” *Chicago Tribune*, 30 March 2012. <https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-xpm-2012-03-30-sns-rt-usa-crimenewhampshirel2e8euceo-20120330-story.html>.

- Mukamana, Donatilla and Petra Brysiewicz. "The Lived Experience of Genocide Rape Survivors in Rwanda." *Journal of Nursing Scholarship* 40, no. 4 (2008): 379-84.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1547-5069.2008.00253.x>.
- Mukangendo, Marie-Consolee. "Caring for Children Born of Rape in Rwanda." In *Born of War: Protecting Children of Sexual Violence Survivors in Conflict Zones*, edited by R. Charli Carpenter, 40-52. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007.
- Nowrojee, Binaifer. *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1996.
- Overy, Richard. "Nuremberg: Nazis on trial." *BBC History*, 17 February 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nuremberg_article_01.
- Pol Pot*. 1980. Digital image. Bettmann Archive.
<https://cdn.britannica.com/s:1500x700,q:85/68/19068-004-3059FB3B/Pol-Pot-1980.jpg>.
- Power, Samantha. "Raising the Cost of Genocide." In *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, 245-64. Edited by Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002.
- Power, Samantha. "Rwanda: 'Mostly in a Listening Mode'." In *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 329-89. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2013.
- Pratkanis, Anthony and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2000.
- The Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., ICTR-98-42-T (2011). Judgement and Sentence.
<https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ict-98-42/trial-judgements/en/110624.pdf>.
- Ranjan, Amit. "Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971: Narratives, Impacts and the Actors." *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 72, no. 2 (2016): 132-45.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928416637921>.
- Reid-Cunningham, Allison Ruby. "Rape as a Weapon of Genocide." *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 3, no. 3 (2008): 279-96.
<https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol3/iss3/4>.
- Reid, Max. *An antisemitic poster entitled, "Behind the enemy powers: the Jew."*. 1933-39. Poster. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC,
<https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1164720>.
- Reynders, Michel. *Nazi propaganda poster with a picture of a Jewish star and a German caption that reads, "Whoever wears this symbol is an enemy of our Volk."*. 1942. Poster. United

- States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC,
<http://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1155552>.
- Rosen, Tove. "The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on International Criminal Law." Robert H. Jackson Center. Accessed 13 November 2013. <https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law>.
- Rothbart, Daniel and Karina V. Korostelina. *Why They Die: Civilian Devastation in Violent Conflict*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011.
- Russell-Brown, Sherrie L. "Rape as an Act of Genocide." *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 21, no. 2 (2003): 350-74. <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol21/iss2/5>.
- Rwanda Video Gallery. "Eyewitness Testimony: Mary "Fifi" Mukangoga." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 28 August 2013. <http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/rwanda/rwanda-video-gallery/eyewitness-testimony-mary-fifi-mukangoga>.
- Semelin, Jacques. *Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939-1943*. Translated by Suzan Husserl-Kapit. Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 1993.
- Schmidt, William E. "Troops Rampage in Rwanda: Dead Said to Include Premier." *New York Times*, 8 April 1994. <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/08/world/troops-rampage-in-rwanda-dead-said-to-include-premier.html>.
- Staub, Ervin. *The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Sukhdev, Shabnam, dir. *Nine Months to Freedom: The Story of Bangladesh*. 1972; Mumbai, IN: Films Division of India, 1975. DVD.
- Talukdar, Rashid. *Refugees Flee toward India through a Subdistrict in East Pakistan's Comilla District (now Bangladesh), 1971*. 1971. Digital image. National Public Radio, Washington, DC, <https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2010/09/29/130221326/test>.
- Taughner, Colleen. *Genocide memorial garden at the Kigali Memorial Centre, Kigali, Rwanda*. n.d. Digital image. Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/National-recovery>.
- Touval, Saadia. "Why the UN Fails." *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 5 (1994): 44-57. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20046830>.
- Understanding the G8. "Members of the G8." Accessed 13 November 2013. <http://www.g8.co.uk/members-of-the-g8/>.

- United Nations. "About Us." Accessed 13 November 2013.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/>.
- United Nations. "Backgrounder." Accessed 4 November 2014.
<http://www.un.org/events/rwanda/backgrounder.html>.
- United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1 UNTS XVI. San Francisco, CA: United Nations, 24 October 1945. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html>.
- United Nations. "History of Peacekeeping." Accessed 4 November 2014.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml>.
- United Nations. "Post Cold-War Surge." Accessed 8 October 2014.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml>.
- United Nations. "Survivor Testimonies." Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations. Accessed 25 October 2013.
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/survivortestimonies.shtml>.
- United Nations. "Troop and Police Contributors." Accessed 13 November 2013.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.
- United Nations. "What is Peacekeeping?" Accessed 8 October 2014.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>.
- United Nations General Assembly. *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. A/RES/260/(III). Paris, FR: United Nations General Assembly, 9 December 1948. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.html>.
- United Nations General Assembly. *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*. A/CONF.183/9 (last amended 2010). Rome, IT: United Nations General Assembly, 17 July 1998. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html>.
- United Nations Security Council. *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions Taken by the UN During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*. S/1999/1257. New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 16 December 1999. <https://undocs.org/S/1999/1257>.
- United States Agency for International Development. *Aftermath: Women in Postgenocide Rwanda*, by Catharine Newbury and Hannah Baldwin. Working Paper no. 303. Washington, DC: PDF, 2000. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaci323.pdf.
- United States Attorney's Office District of Massachusetts. "Woman Charged with Unlawfully Obtaining Citizenship by Misrepresenting her Activities During the 1994 Rwandan Genocide." USAO, 24 June 2010.
<https://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2010/June/MunyenyeziBeatricePR.html>.

- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. *Members of the SA During the Boycott of Jewish-Owned Businesses*. 1 April 1933. Photograph. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media_ph.php?ModuleId=10005678&MediaId=2680.
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Women in the Third Reich." Holocaust Encyclopedia. Accessed 14 November 2013. <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/women-in-the-third-reich>.
- Ward, Victoria. "Serbian war criminals: Slobodan Milosevic profile." *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/serbia/8538575/Serbian-war-criminals-Slobodan-Milosevic-profile.html>.
- Weitsman, Patricia A. "The Politics of Identity and Sexual Violence: A Review of Bosnia and Rwanda." *Human Rights Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2008): 561-78. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20072859>.
- Whitaker, Donald P. *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia)*. Washington, DC: American University, 1973.
- World Peace Foundation. "Bangladesh: War of liberation." Mass Atrocity Endings. 7 August 2015. <https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/bangladesh-war-of-liberation/>.
- Yale University. "The CGP, 1994-2013." Yale Cambodia Genocide Program. Accessed 14 October 2014. <http://www.yale.edu/cgp/>.
- Zraly, Maggie, Julia Rubin Smith, and Theresa Betancourt. "Primary Mental Health Care for Survivors of Collective Sexual Violence in Rwanda." *Global Public Health* 6, no. 3 (2010): 257-70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2010.493165>.